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Until 1980, Turkish economic policies were typical of those of most 
developing countries. A policy of import substitution had been consistently followed 
since the·1950's, with prohibition of imports of commodities for which domestic 
production was deemed adequate. In part to foster import substitution, but more 
importantly because foreign exchange was always scarce, those policies were 
buttressed by quantitative restrictions on imports and tight exchange control, which 
increased the inner orientation of the economy even beyond that which would have 
resulted with those policies undertaken to encourage import substitution. State 
economic enterprises (SEEs) had been established and expanded to process and 
market agricultural commodities, to extract and export minerals, and to produce a 
wide variety of manufactured goods. Negative real interest rates enabled the 
government to direct resources through allocation of rationed credit, as well as 
through import licensing. 
In the course of economic growth iii the postwar period, the Turkish authorities 
had twice been confronted with mounting balance of payment difficulties and rising 
inflation. In both instances, there had been fairly typical stabilization programs, which 
succeeded in improving the foreign exchange situation and, in the earlier crises in 
1958, drastically reducing inflation. 
By the late 1970's, Turkey was confronting yet another crisis. Inflation had 
accelerated throughout the 1970's and reached an annual rate of over 100 percent by 
late 1979 -- this in a country with relatively few indexation mechanisms and strong 
sensitivity to inflation on the part of influential groups, including the civil service and 
the military. 
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While the political reaction to inflation alone would probably have forced 
policy changes, foreign exchange shortages at an increasingly overvalued exchange 
rate were also resulting in major difficulties and dislocations resulting in negative 
gross foreign exchange reserves by late 1979. There were long delays in obtaining 
import licenses and foreign exchange, embassy employees overseas went months 
without being paid, there was no coffee, and the short supplies of petroleum and other 
imports resulted in severe dislocations and hardships. According to the official 
statistics, real GNP fell only 5 percent over the 1977-79 period, but contemporary 
accounts and observations of those who Jived through it suggest a far steeper drop, 
especially starting in the second half of 1979 [Ref. 7:p. 29]. 
Throughout the latter part of the 1970's, successive coalition governments had 
attempted unsuccessfully to grapple with economic difficulties. Several IMP-
supported programs had been started, only to be abandoned when they proved 
infeasible to implement them. Governments changed frequently, largely in response 
to dissatisfaction with economic performance. By the beginning of the 1980's, it 
seemed clear that Turkey was in for yet another round of stabilization following the 
patterns of 1958 and 1970. 
However, when policy changes came in early 1980, they were far different, 
both in announcement and in action, from the two earlier types. Instead of primarily 
addressing the macroeconomic issues driving inflation and the immediate balance-of-
payments difficulties, the authorities announced a program that had two fundamental 
objectives: 1) to alter underlying economic policies aimed toward growth, and 2) 
reduce the rate of inflation. While this second objective had been included in both 
earlier programs, the enunciation and pursuit of the first objective constituted a major 
departure from past economic policies. 
From its initiation, the sectoral reform program was articulated and designed 
to shift Turkey's entire growth strategy away form import substitution and toward 
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greater integration with the international market. Moreover, it was explicitly stated 
that the role of government in the economy was to be greatly diminished and that 
private enterprise would be relied upon to generate economic growth. In summary, 
the main objectives of the new Economic Stabilization Program were a reduction in 
government in production activities, increased emphasis on market forces, the 
replacement of an inward-looking strategy with an export oriented strategy of import 
substitution, and the attraction of foreign investment. 
Policy reforms continued into the 1980s. Although macro reforms were 
initially successful, with the rate of inflation falling from over 100 percent to a low 
of about 35 percent in 1982, the rate of inflation rose again, and inflation continued 
to be a problem throughout the 1980's. By contrast, as the decade proceeded, the 
sectoral reforms geared to shifting reliance toward the private sector and integrating 
the Turkish economy with that of the rest of the world gathered momentum. By the 
early 1990's, it could be said that Turkey's reforms had been-- at least to 1991--
successful, while Turkey's macro reforms had failed. 
We can identify six periods in Turkey's political and economic development 
process. The first period, from 1923 to 1950, witnessed the founding of the republic 
and rebuilding of the war-tom country through "Etatism" within a single party 
political system. During the second period, which roughly covered the 1950's, 
democracy emerged, with a multi-party system and the first wave of liberalization in 
economic management. 
The third period was inaugurated in 1960 with the first of two coups d'etat and 
introduction of the concept of five-year indicative development plans, with heavy 
emphasis on import substitution. Since the first plan, which covered the 1963-67 
period, there has been a continuous succession of five year plans and annual 
programs. 
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The fourth period, from 1971 to 1980, was a return to democracy, albeit an 
unstable one, in which successive coalition governments were too weak to respond 
to internal and external economic difficulties, political difficulties and changing 
circumstances. Of particular importance were episodes of civil violence between left 
and right factions and severe labor strikes. 
The fifth period was marked by the successful implementation of a new 
economic reform program in 1980 under a militazy-backed government. Democracy 
was once again restored in 1983, under which the reform program continued 
uninterrupted and was even strengthened. However, during the rest of the 1980s the 
reforms met with gradually decreasing success even though the same technopol was 
in charge (in a higher office). 
At the beginning of the current period, in 1990, a new, populist political 
coalition consisting of parties of the center-right and center-left (social democrats) 
came to power. The coalition government formed its own economic team, in which 
the management of the Central Bank represented the only continuity of the reform 
program. 
B. OBJECTIVES OF THIS THESIS 
The research and analysis involved in this thesis will contribute to an 
understanding of the Turkish experience in economic stabilization during the 1980s. 
The body of the thesis will focus on the government's attempts at structural 
adjustment and economic liberalization, especially those occurring during the 1980s. 
Based on this analysis, the thesis will assess the sustainability of the Turkish program. 
Finally, generalizations will be drawn as to the efficiency of economic policy making 
in Turkey. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research questions are: 
1. What were the implemented economic policies before 1980? 
2. What were the institutional and policy oriented reforms and their 
priorities during the 1980s? 
3. Which steps have been taken as part of the new economic policy? 
4. How can we assess the level of success for infrastructural change? 
5. Which recommendations can be made with regard to managing 
macroeconomic policies and long-run economic growth? 
The subsidiary questions include the following: 
1. What kind of external factors created the transition in the economy? 
2. Which steps have been followed for structural adjustment in the 1980s? 
3. What ·were the economic pQlicy tools of the stabilization and 
liberalization periods. 
4. How did implemented economic policy tools affect the performance 
indicators? 
5. What were the favorable outcomes during the period? 
6. What are the reasons for successful sectoral and failed macro reforms? 
7. What are the main determinants of economic growth and 
macroeconomic policies, and how can we manage these factors? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this study is to offer a general discussion of the patterns of 
development in Turkey between 1923 and 1991 by contrasting the 1923-1980 period 
with the post-liberalization era of the 1980s, and to analyze the dynamics of economic 
growth and the concomitant mutation the economy underwent during these years. It 
also strives to demonstrate that, despite some favorable effects, these liberalization 
attempts and structural adjustment policies failed to remedy some of the most 
important structural problems of the Turkish economy. 
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I do not expect, however, to capture the sociopolitical perspective of this 
complex transformation, nor to give a historical reasoning of this dichotomous period 
from an economic perspective. Much of the analysis in this study concentrates on the 
macro developmental aspects of the Turkish experience, without losing sight, insofar 
as possible, of the historical specificity of the underlying process. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I will discuss the objectives and methodology of the thesis after a brief 
background. Chapter ll will explain Turkey's economic situation before 1980 by 
dividing the period into subperiods and by analyzing the consequences of the 
implemented policies in these subperiods. Chapter ill will investigate the 1980s' 
economic stabilization and liberalization policies and their effects on economic policy 
indicators in Turkey and statistical data will be investigated. Chapter V will present 
a reasonable approach, including all the pros and cons, to managing macroeconomic 
policies and long-run economic growth for the future prospects of the Turkish 
economy. Interpretation of all data and generalizations drawn to the efficiency of 
economic policy making will lead to the conclusion in Chapter VI. 
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ll. TURKEY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION BEFORE 1980 
A. GENERAL 
Turkey became an independent state after the First World War as the Ottoman 
Empire disintegrated. With Atatiirk as a national charismatic leader, economic policy 
for raising living standards was already an important issue in the 1920s and 1930s. 
After a brief effort to develop in the 1920s, Atatiirk switched to Etatism [Ref. 1 :p. 99] 
as a philosophy in the 1930s, and the first large State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) 
were founded, producing textiles, footwear and a variety of other manufactured 
goods. 
Atatiirk died in 1938, but remained the revered founding father of the nation. 
In the postwar period, economic growth resumed, with SEEs expanding rapidly into 
new import substitution activities. The underlying policy of Etatism remained the 
guiding principle of development efforts unti11980. 
Turkey had pursued different development strategies and the performance of 
the economy in different periods and sub-periods since the foundation of the new 
Turkish Republic in 1923. But the key development strategy was for the state to 
intervene in the economic sphere, in order to lay the foundations for the development 
of private enterprise and to stimulate growth in those sectors of the economy 
neglected by private capital. The size of the domestic market and general 
international acceptance of this etatist strategy made it possible for successive Turkish 
governments to cany on building the economy behind closed doors, thus contributing 
to the emergence of a strong national middle class [Ref. 2:p. 80]. 
The years 1934-1948 were the period of implementation of the first industrial 
development plan in which an effort for achieving rapid industrialization was made 
under the etatist regime [Ref. 3:p. 295]. After development received attention, in 
accordance with the proceedings of the Izmir Congress, held in 1923, the strategy of 
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encouragement of the private sector was stressed. With the law of encouragement of 
industry put in force in 1927, private industrial investments were encouraged through 
various means available. But private savings and investments were not adequate at 
the time to achieve a satisfactory rate of economic growth and industrialization. fu 
1934, the government accepted the principles of etatism --that is, giving the leading 
role to the state and State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) in attaining rapid growth and 
industrialization. 
Etatism has been defined as intervention of the state as a pioneer and director 
of industrial activity, in the interest of national development and security, in a country 
in which private enterprise is either suspect or ineffective. A philosophy regarding 
the role and strategy of state enterprise -- development of basic industries and new 
industries of advanced technology, for example-- has to be translated into specific 
individual enterprise objectives and investment decisions. futegrity in objectives is 
important in itself; it is also necessary for unambiguous measures of performance. 
Several considerations must be taken into account in fixing the objectives of the state 
enterprises, such as financial return, economic return, capital intensity and labor 
intensity, and dynamic growth. [Ref. 7:pp. 19-20] 
During the 1930s two new development banks were established to finance and 
control the expanding state industrial sector. The first of these, Sumerbank (Sumerian 
Bank), was set up in 1933 with a nominal capital of TL 20 million, increased in 
successive stages to TL 200 million by 1946. fu 1935 a second state agency, Etibank 
(Hittite Bank) was established, with primary responsibility for the mining industry. 
Eventually, Etibank acquired total responsibility for the mining industry. 
Beginning in the late 1940s, Turkey's economy grew rapidly, as the 
opportunities afforded by postwar recovery, receipt of Point IV and Marshall Plan 
aid, and a buoyant world economy all contributed to economic growth [Ref. 7:p. 7]. 
Simultaneously, there was a rapid increase in government expenditures, especially on 
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investment projects designed to accelerate economic growth. During 1950-1959, a 
crucial area of policy, as always, was the relative weight to be attached to the state 
and private sectors in industrial development. Early stages of development required 
the building up of infrastructure and expansion of basic industrial and agricultural 
materials by means of public investments and SEEs. Originally, the SEEs were 
supposed to operate with a high degree of autonomy and to strive for profits as a 
private business would have done. 
Export growth ceased in 19531, due to the end of the Korean war commodity 
boom and the shift of resources to the buoyant domestic market. The rate of inflation 
accelerated simultaneously. As in many countries at that time, the Turkish authorities 
were committed to maintaining a fixed nominal exchange rate. By 1954, the 
government introduced import licensing in an effort to restrain the demand for 
imports in line with the availability of foreign exchange. Over the next several years, 
inflationary pressures intensified2 while foreign exchange earnings continued to drop. 
By 1957 the situation was serious. Surcharges had been imposed on imports; even 
those who received import licenses waited eight to twelve months for foreign 
exchange permits. Export earnings were dropping rapidly, and the black market 
premium was more than 100 percent above the nominal exchange rate. At that time, 
as in many other countries, the top political leadership (Adnan Menderes) was 
opposed to any change in the nominal exchange rate. By then, Turkey was financing 
imports with suppliers' credits and other short-term, high-interest-bearing notes. As 
1Twkey had expanded the area under cultivation for wheat through introduction of tractors and mechanization 
in the late 1940s and was the world's largest wheat exporter in the early 1950s. The evidence suggests that this 
large effort was in fact uneconomic in the long run, and wheat exports peaked in 1952. For detailed information, 
see [Ref. 4]. 
2Jt is difficult to provide a good estimate of the rate ofinflation. The Turkish authorities imposed price controls 
on most basic consumer goods in an effort to restrain inflation, and it was the official prices of those goods that 
entered into the official price statistics. According to those statistics, the rate of inflation reached an annual rate 
of almost 25 percent by 1958, having exceeded 10 percent annually since 1954. 
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the 1958 harvest approached, even that source of financing was disappearing, and it 
became evident that without a change in policy, little, if any, gasoline would be 
available to enable the trucks to move to ports. 
Reluctantly, the government of Turkey agreed with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to a stabilization program, the key elements of which were a major 
devaluation (from TL 2.8 to TL 9 per U.S. dollar); immediate import liberalization 
and rationalization of import licensing schemes3; ceilings on government 
expenditures, credit and the money supply; and an increase in prices of commodities 
produced by SEES, with the removal of price controls over most items for the private 
economy. 4 Import liberalization was financed by the IMF and through other official 
credits; official creditors also sponsored and supported debt rescheduling for Turkey's 
outstanding debt. [Ref. 4:chap. 2] 
Most of the components of this package are fairly standard in IMF -supported 
programs. A possible exception is the increases in prices of SEEs, which also 
featured prominently in the 1970s and 1980s reforms. As already mentioned, efforts 
to control inflation in the years prior to 1958 consisted largely of the imposition of 
price controls. Private sector firms responded either by shutting down or by selling 
on the black market. SEEs, however, sold at official prices and incurred losses. As 
inflation accelerated, these losses mounted. The losses, in turn, were covered by 
credits automatically extended by Central Bank to the various loss-making SEEs. The 
result was growth in the money supply fueled in significant measure by SEE deficits. 
Raising the prices of goods produced by SEEs in 1958 naturally resulted in an 
immediate increase in the various price indices; after that, however, the reduced rate 
of expansion of Central Bank credits resulted in a reduced rate of inflation. Indeed, 
the 1958 Turkish stabilization program was unusual in that real GDP, which had been 
3For more detailed information, see [Ref 4:chap. 6]. 
4For an analysis of the program, see [Ref S:pp. 197-219]. 
10 
declining, started growing immediately in response to greater availability of imports, 
while the rate of inflation dropped dramatically: from 25 percent in 1958 to less than 
5 percent in 1959. After the initial stabilization plan in the summer of 1958, export 
earnings rose, other foreign exchange receipts increased, and the flow of imports 
returned to more normal levels relative to the level of economic activity. Although 
there was a temporary setback in 1959 as the expenditure and other ceilings 
negotiated with the IMF were violated, a military coup in May 1960 was 
accompanied by a recommitment to the major provisions of the stabilizatimi program. 
The rate of growth of real GDP accelerated, and Turkey was among the more rapidly 
growing developing countries for most of the 1960s. 
However, Turkey's annual inflation rate in the 1960s was in the 5-10 percent 
range, and the nominal exchange rate was held constant after the 1958 devaluation. 
Public and private investment expenditures had increased rapidly in the early 1960s, 
financed largely by foreign aid. In the latter part of the 1960s, when foreign aid did 
not increase, the government attempted to maintain the rate of investment. The 
increased demand for imports resulted in lengthening the waiting list at the Central 
Bank. Delays in obtaining imports needed for spare parts and immediate goods 
increased anywhere from a year to eighteen months. The resulting excess capacity 
in newly established import substitution industries, combined with the slow-down in 
investment projects resulting from delays in obtaining imports, was a visible restraint 
on economic activity and growth. [Ref. 7:pp. 5-32] 
Although inflation was accelerating, the foreign exchange situation was the 
biggest impetus to the 1970 devaluation. Even though circumstances were not as 
extreme as they had been in 1958, the import substitution activities that had been 
carried out during the 1960s had left the economy more dependant on imports of 
intermediate goods and raw materials to continue factory operations than had earlier 
been the case; inflation was not widely perceived to be a major problem. The 1970 
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devaluation had many of the same components as the earlier one, although emphasis 
was much more on the foreign trade regime and the exchange rate than in 1958. The 
nominal exchange rate was adjusted from TL 9 per U.S. dollar to TL 15; the 
government again received extensive foreign credits, and imports were liberalized. 
In contrast to the 1958 devaluation, however, the economy's response to the 
1970 devaluation was much more rapid. In particular, export earning rose sharply, 
and at the same time, Turkish workers (Gastarbeiter) in Germany and other western 
European countries remitted sizeable amounts of foreign exchange. There was no 
mechanism readily at hand for the Central Bank to sterilize these inflows, and as a 
consequence, these remittances expanded the Turkish money supply sharply. 
Inflation therefore accelerated, although foreign exchange was plentiful. During the 
first half of the 1970s, real economic growth was rapid with expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policies. By 1975, real growth rates of around 7 percent annually was an 
unchangeable constant: Turkey had been growing rapidly and per capita incomes had 
been rising steadily since the early 1950s, despite population growth in excess of 2.5 
percent annually. [Ref. 7:pp. 5-32] 
Inflation had already reached an annual rate of 25 percent by 1973 when the 
first increase in the world price of oil was effected. Although the nominal exchange 
rate had been held constant since 1970, foreign exchange receipts from exports and 
from workers' remittances continued rising sharply, showing that there was no 
immediate foreign exchange problem. Indeed, the Turkish authorities were in the 
unaccustomed situation of accumulation foreign exchange reserves in 1971 and 1972. 
When the terms of trade deteriorated sharply because of oil, the authorities failed 
initially to alter the internal prices of petroleum and its products, instead, letting the 
SEE handling petroleum incur losses and financing the increased cost of imports out 
of foreign exchange reserves. Fiscal deficits therefore increased in 1974 and 1975, 
as the overvaluation of the exchange rate associated with accelerating inflation 
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increased, while the fiscal deficit itself and the failure to change the internal price of 
oil and its derivatives made the situation worse [Ref. 6:p. 346]. 
Table 2.1 gives data on the economic deterioration between 1975 and 1980. 
Imports increased sharply in 1980 after the January policy changes and the rapid 
downward spiral in real GDP was reversed. It is evident by these annual figures that 
real GDP grew only 15 percent between 1975 and 1980, while population increased 
by almost the same amount. 
Acceleration of inflation resulted in economic discomfort for many influential 
groups-- the military, civil servants, academics, pensioners-- whose incomes were 
fixed without indexation. As seen in Table 2.1, imports continued to grow in 1976 
and 1977, albeit slowly. However, by 1978, sources of :financing were disappearing, 
and imports were reduced with consequent dislocations of economic activity. 
Table 2.1. Indicators of Turkish Economic Deterioration, 1975-80 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Real GDP per capita 100 109 113 118 116 115 
(1975 = 100) 
Wholesale prices 100 116 142 213 353 761 
(1975 = 100) 
Current account deficit 1,648 2,029 3,140 1,265 1,413 3,408 
(millions ofUS$) 
Imports 4,502 4,872 5,506 4,369 4,815 7,513 
(millions ofUS$) 
Total debt 3.6 4.3 11.4 14.8 15.9 19.0 
{billions ofUS$} 
Source: Ref. 7, Appendix tables for first four rows, Table 6, p. 28 for debt. 
One other phenomenon of the late 1970s was weak coalition governments 
during that period. In part, those weak coalitions reflected underlying divisions 
within society and societal unrest. This was reflected, inter alia, in the radicalization · 
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oflabor unions and of student groups, with attendant violence and civil unrest. 5 It is 
estimated that eight million man-days were lost to strikes in 1980, compared to one 
million for all of 1979 [Ref 9:p. 359]. The impact on the economy of the unions was 
substantial. On the one hand, they demanded, and most got, large wage increases. 
On the other hand, once wage increases were granted, unions were frequently 
reorganized under new leadership and went on strike once again to demand even 
more. From the viewpoint of Turkish industry, however, the strikes and work 
stoppages were highly disruptive and were at least as damaging as the delays and 
shortages of imports. 
The Turkish economy was in severe disequilibrium by 1980. Inflation had 
reached triple digits and was still accelerating; imports were constrained, and the 
premiums on import licenses and on the black market foreign exchange were high and 
rising rapidly. Real output and incomes were falling. The reasons for this are clear 
in the policy indicators: 
A highly overvalued and unrealistic nominal exchange rate, 
a large and growing fiscal deficit and rapid expansion of the money 
supply, 
severe restrictions on foreign trade and domestic investment (because 
of foreign exchange difficulties). 
In 1978 and 1979, two stabilization programs were negotiated with the IMF.6 
Both of these programs were abandoned when the agreed-upon polices were not 
enacted, as the coalition governments were simply unable to restrain government 
expenditures, reduce SEE deficits, or raise taxes. When Suleyman Demirel became 
Prime Minister of another coalition government in the fall of 1979, he inherited an 
extremely difficult economic situation. He had no parliamentary support as had the 
5For more detailed information, see [Ref. 8]. 
6For detailed information see [Ref. 10]. 
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preceding governments under Bulent Ecevit, but the fact that the economic 
deterioration had been so prolonged perhaps gave him some room for maneuvering. 
In a sense, the usual political coalitions that had prevented action earlier were 
rendered ineffective by the severity of the crisis. 
B. THE INITIATION OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 1923-1930 
In 1933, at the height of the world economic depression, the new state of 
Turkey, a republic then barely ten years old, became the first of the "Third World" 
nations to undertake a planned economy. A doctrine for state planning had been laid 
two years before with the official adoption of etatism, which called for artificial 
stimulation of the economy through government intervention. During the first ten 
years of the Republic, the government in Ankara adhered to specifically Laissez-faire7 
economic policies that had been spelled out early in 1923 by a national economic 
congress held at Izmir, during the interval between two sessions of the Lausanne 
Peace Conference. 
In the course of the Izmir Congress of 1923 two crucial policy issues were 
debated at length. The first issue concerned the role of the state in the development 
of the economy. In his speech to the delegates, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, the Minister 
of Economy, outlined the government's ideological stance: 
We are not attached to Laissez-faire, socialist, communist, etatist or 
protectionist schools of thought. We have a new school of thought 
which belongs to new Turkey and corresponds to a new economic 
outlook. I call it the new Turkish Economic School [Ref. 11:p. 262]. 
The new Turkey should follow a mixed economic system, economic 
enterprises should be undertaken partly by the state and partly by 
private individuals. For example, the state should direct large scale 
credit and industrial undertakings [Ref. 12:p. 39]. 
7The theory of government that upholds the autonomous character of the economic order, believing that 
government should intervene as little as possible in the direction of economic affairs. 
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In general, however, it was to become clear that the government was initially 
ready to allow private enterprise the major role in industrial development, and to limit 
direct government intervention to basic public utilities and certain state monopolies 
which had a primarily fiscal purpose. 
A second critical debate concerned the role of foreign capital in economic 
development. On this score, it is somewhat assumed that the new regime was hostile 
to foreign investment. This view is not supported by contemporary declarations and 
actions. It is certainly true that the republican government was determined to avoid 
indebting the state to foreign bondholders. On the other hand, they were fully 
prepared to allow foreign investors to undertake specific projects. 
After 1923, direct government investment was mainly limited to the state 
monopolies. These had been established primarily to raise revenue, but they did not 
give the government an interest in developing the industries concerned. · After a 
massive extension of the railway network, the government focused on the tobacco 
monopoly. Other government monopolies were established for matches and 
explosives and the import of sugar and oil products. 
Although agriculture was obviously the basic source of Turkey's wealth, the 
government played a less active role in its development. Its principal medium of 
intervention was the agricultural bank which was reorganized in 1924. 
In the broader field of fiscal and monetary policy, one of the new regime's first 
priorities was to balance its budget. As Table 2.2 indicates, the government had 
succeeded in balancing the budget in 1926, after previous massive deficits. This 
improvement was achieved by tightening up the collection of revenue, rather than 
cutting expenditures [Ref. 12:p. 44]. 
There was erratic growth during this period. One reason is that climatic 
conditions favored agriculture during the first three years of the Republic. Apart from 
this, recovery from wartime dislocation seems the most likely cause of the sharp 
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increase in economic activity from 1923 to 1926. Domestically produced goods 
began to replace imports. Before the First World War, Turkey had imported all her 
sugar; by 1927, the new beet-sugar factories were meeting just less than 8 percent of 
consumption, rising to 49 percent in 1932. By 1930, the share of textiles and sugar 
in total imports had been reduced to about 35 percent. 
Table 2.2. Government Revenue and Expenditure, 
1913/14 to 1929/30 (TL million) 
Financial Receipts Expenditure Receipts Retail Price 
Year as%of Index 
Expenditure 
1913/14 29.2 33.7 86.6 100 
1917/18 31.7 60.3 52.2 
1923/24 51.0 104.0 49.0 1,279 
1924/25 111.3 135.2 82.3 1,343 
1925/26 138.5 210.1 65.9 1,415 
1926/27 170.4 179.9 94.7 1,466 
1927/28 197.5 202.9 97.3 1,452 
1928/29 204.6 204.2 100.2 1,474 
1929/30 206.1 214.5 96.0 1,533 
Source: Turkish State Planning Organization 
In spite of the growth of import replacement industries during the 1920s, the 
overall situation of Turkey's foreign trade was less encouraging. The substantial 
foreign trade deficit of prewar days continued until 1923, but was thereafter reduced 
to 10-15 percent of Turkey's total foreign trade. The deficit increased again in 1929, 
however, as importers rushed to build up stocks before the imposition of the new, 
higher tariff. After this, imports were cut back sharply, so that Turkey actually had 
a positive trade balance in 1930. 
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C. THE ETATIST PERIOD (1930-1950) 
1. Industry 
The Etatist principles of economic development which were adopted by the 
regime during the 1930s have been subjected to any number of definitions and 
interpretations. The regime itself generally preferred to define Turkish Etatism as a 
home-grown product, arrived at by an objective analysis of Turkey's economic 
situation rather than dogmatic ideological commi1ments. In practice, the state had the 
major responsibility for undertaking new industrial inves1ments, even if this left 
private entrepreneurs at a disadvantage. 
The main practical attempt of the Etatist regime was Turkey's five year 
industrialization plan, which was drawn up in 1933 and put into operation between 
1934 and 1938. The plan provided for the establishment of a series of industrial 
plants to reduce Turkey's need for imported consumer and intermediate goods using 
domestic raw materials. State agencies were to be responsible for financing, 
constructing and managing these plants. The main industries affected were the 
manufacturers of cotton and wool textiles, paper, ceramics, glass, cement, and some 
chemical products besides iron and steel. Emphasis was put on the industrialization 
of the backward regions of central and eastern Anatolia. Most of this development 
was realized within the plan period. 
In order to finance and control the expanding state industrial sector, two new 
development banks were established during the 1930s. The first of these, Sumerbank, 
was set up in 1933, and the other, Etibank, in 1935. The initial capital of both banks 
was subscribed by the government or inherited in the form of assets from predecessor 
organizations. Subsequently, they derived their funds from further direct allocations 
from the budget, from government loans, and in the form of advances from the 
Central Bank on Treasury-guaranteed gills. From the beginning, they also operated 
as commercial banks, opening branches and accepting deposits from the public [Ref. 
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12:p. 57]. However, as time went on, these deposits represented a shrinking 
proportion of their total capital and liabilities. In other words, both organizations 
acted as state-owned holding companies with minor banking functions, rather than as 
state-controlled banks. 
It was only during World War II that the government took stringent measures 
to control the private as well as the state sector of the economy. Whatever her prewar 
policies, Turkey, like other countries, was virtually compelled to introduce a new 
range of economic controls. In the process, the state sector increased its share of 
industrial output, at the expense of the private sector. Production by the SEEs 
increased by approximately 49 percent between 1939 and 1945, whereas that of the 
private sector rose by only 7 percent. The first economic casualty of the war was a 
second five-year industrialization plan, prepared in 1936, and intended to be put into 
operation during 1939-1943 [Ref. 13:pp. 3-9]. The only important new plant initiated 
during the second plan period was the iron and steel mill, which had been provided 
for in the fust plan, but didn't begin production until the end of 1939. 
After initiation of a multi-party system, the new Democratic Party's 1946 
program stressed that private enterprise should play a much more active role in the 
economy and the limits of state economic activity should be clearly defined. During 
the postwar period, the Republican People's Party (RPP) government took some steps 
to put its new principles into practice. In particular, government monopolies in 
imported coffee, beer, wine and explosives were legally ended in 1946. The relative 
shares of the state and private sectors in the production of such items as cotton, where 
private enterprise had an important role, did not alter dramatically between 1945 and 
1950. 
2. Agriculture 
The increase in demand for raw materials as a result of industrial expansion, 
together with the extension of the railway network, led to better prospects for those 
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fanners who could produce such crops as beets or cotton. From an average of 
approximately 500,000 tons per year between 1928 and 1935, the output of industrial 
crops rose to an average of approximately 1.2 million tons for 1936-1940 and 1.8 
million tons for 1946-1950. 
The state's most important intervention in agriculture during the 1930s was 
price support. Overall agricultural production, which had risen steadily during the 
1930s, appears to have fallen during World War II. At the end of the war the regime 
attempted to tackle the general problem of rural poverty by enacting land reform 
legislation, but its efforts met with little success [Ref. 12:p. 63]. 
3. Labor, Social Policy and Education 
Turkey's population growth rate fluctuated during the 1930s and 1940s. The 
average rate of increase stood at about 1.7 percent per year for 1935-1950, or an 
absolute rise of just less than 4.8 million (from approximately 16.2 million to 20.9 
million). It was surprising that there had been no significant change in the structure 
of the workforce; indeed, industrial employment, as a proportion of the total, actually 
appeared to have dropped. Table 2.3 shows that a higher proportion of entrants to the 
workforce were engaged in agriculture and industry. 
Table 2.3. Economically Active Population, by Sector (1935-1950) 














Before World War II, various SEEs, government departments and local 
authorities began to provide hospitals, clinics, and in some cases, retirement pension 
schemes for their employees. 
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Education was the most important area in which the Republican regime had 
focused its efforts. Expenditures on education, as a proportion of total budget, rose 
from 5 percent in 1930, to 6 percent in 1938 and 12 percent by 1950 [Ref. 14:p. 148]. 
The overall growth of the educational system between 1927 and 1950 is indicated in 
Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4. Education Indicators, 1927-1950 
Population 
(millions) School Enrollment (thousands) 
Years Primary Middle High 
1927 13.6 462.0 19.9 11.2 
1940 17.8 813.6 85.0 27.6 
1950 20.9 1,591.0 67.4 39.1 
Source: Turkish State Plauning Organization 





The budgetary and monetary policies implemented during the 1930s were a 
continuation of the main principles followed during the second half of the previous 
decade. 
Inflation was caused by excess demand. Since the interest paid on savings 
deposits has generally been well below the rate of inflation, bank customers hold 
savings as well as sight deposits for the sale of the liquidity rather than as an 
investment. 
On the basis of the data in Table 2.5, it seems that the volume of currency in 
circulation increased by only about 21 percent between 1933 and 1938, in line with 
the conservative policies followed by the government. The rise in bank deposits was 
steeper, however, and the expansion of the banking system produced a significant 
increase in the total money supply. Most of the rise in money supply seems to have 
been absorbed by increased output of goods and services. 
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Table 2.5. Money Supply and Prices (TL Millions) 
Years Currency Bank Total o/o Rise o/o Rise o/o Rise 
Deposits 1+2 in3 in GNP in prices 
1933 198 129 327 - 13.4 -
1934 205 128 333 1.8 6.7 -
1935 212 132 344 3.3 -2.4 11.8 
1936 221 153 374 8.7 19.1 10.4 
1937 235 183 418 11.8 3.3 4.7 
1938 240 201 441 5.5 8.8 -4.6 
1939 318 190 508 15.2 8.3 4.8 
1940 430 191 621 22.2 -6.2 22.7 
1941 564 224 788 26.9 -9.1 40.7 
1942 700 289 989 25.5 4.5 92.1 
1943 838 306 1,144 15.7 -9.3 74.0 
1944 1,013 338 1,351 18.1 -4.2 -22.9 
1945 1,051 416 1,467 8.6 -13.6 -3.0 
1946 989 488 1,477 0.7 29.0 -3.2 
1947 1,059 594 1,653 11.9 5.7 1.1 
1948 1,106 663 1,679 1.6 13.4 7.5 
1949 1,072 724 1,796 7.0 -4.5 8.0 
1950 1,081 775 1,856 3.3 9.1 -10.2 
Source: Turkish State Planning Organization 
The establishment of a Central Bank in 1930 was a significant development. 
Some functions of the bank were to act as the government's fiscal agent, to rediscount 
commercial and agricultural bills, fix discount and interest rates, make advances to 
the Treasury, and to carry out controls on foreign currency. In 1938, the Central 
Bank was authorized to make advances on bills issued by the State Economic 
Enterprises (SEEs) and guaranteed by the Treasmy, and to issue supplenientmy paper 
money accordingly. These new functions substantially increased the government's 
ability to resort to deficit financing, and had a crucial effect during subsequent years. 
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5. Foreign Trade 
As the figures in Table 2.6 show, the consistent deficit in the balance of visible 
trade which Turkey had experienced during the 1920s was reversed in the following 
decade. Although the volume of exports increased substantially during the first half 
of the 1930s, the decline in commodity prices and the consequent worsening of the 
tenns of the trade pushed down the value of exports between 1930 and 1933, with a 
moderate recover thereafter. Invisible imports and capital movements reduced these 
surpluses, so that the overall balance of payments has seen a deficit for some years. 
Table 2.6. Balance of Visible Trade (Million $ US) 
Years hnports Exports Deficit/ Deficit/ Nominal 
Surplus Surplus as% value of 
of total trade $inTL 
1930 69.5 71.4 1.8 1.3 2.12 
1931 59.9 60.2 0.3 0.3 2.11 
1932 40.7 48.0 7.3 8.1 2.11 
1933 45.1 58.0 13.0 12.5 1.66 
1935 70.6 76.2 5.6 3.8 1.26 
1938 118.9 115.0 -3.9 -1.7 1.26 
1941 55.3 91.1 35.7 17.0 1.31 
1944 126.2 177.9 51.7 17.0 1.31 
1947 244.6 223.3 -21.3 -4.6 2.80 
1950 295.7 263.4 -22.2 -4.0 2.80 
Source: Turkish State Planning Organization 
D. THE DEMOCRATIC DECADE (1950-1960) 
When the Democratic Party stepped into power in Ankara in 1950, there were 
high hopes that Turkey had entered a brave and bright new era. The Democrats 
believed in incentives rather than directives as the driving force of national progress. 
In practical tenns, they were determined to devote more attention to the problems of 
the neglected, but electorally important, agricultural sector and to encourage private 
industry at the expense of state enterprises. 
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For the first four years of the decade economic growth was high and generally 
satisfactory. After a period of postwar expansio~ the Turkish economy showed 
sluggish growth and trade imbalances between the mid-1950s and the beginning of 
the 1960s. Annual growth rates of industrial production averaged 4.3 percent in the 
second part of the 1950s, while that of agriculture remained at 1.8 percent. Exports 
and imports fell below their 1953 levels and did not recover until1960. It is during 
this period that comprehensive protectionist measures were introduced to overcome 
the persistent deficits in the balance of payments, together with price control 
programs, to curtail inflation. Although the origin of strong state intervention in the 
economy dates back to the early 1930s, a strong orientation toward import-
substituting development strategies and interventionist development programs 
generated a revival of interest in the stagnant economic conditions of this period, 
despite the official policy of the government that preached laissez-faire and free 
competition. [Ref. 15:p. 1] 
1. Industry 
A crucial area of policy, as always, was the relative weight to be attached to 
the state and private sectors in industrial development. In his government program 
of 1951, Menderes declared that state undertakings other than those engaged "solely 
in fields related to basic industries and having a public character" should be turned 
over to private firms. And some of the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) were 
actually transferred to private hands. Private industiy was dominated by individual 
entrepreneurs who were generally unaccustomed to managing the large plants. 
Although some of the SEEs could make respectable profits, there was absolutely no 
incentive for private capital to take over such loss-making operations like the state-
owned coal mines or steel industiy. 
The share of private and state sectors in capital formation fluctuated during the 
decade. During the first four years of the decade, agricultural production boomed, 
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increasing the overall level of economic activity, foreign exchange was freely 
available for the import of industrial inputs, and the rate of inflation was kept at a 
relatively low level. In these conditions, the private sector increased its investment 
and played its part in generating a sharp rise in industrial output. 
After 1954, however, there was a serious deterioration. Agricultural 
production flagged, inflation rose to high levels, and there was a chronic shortage of 
foreign exchange on which industry depended for some materials as well as some 
equipment. 
2. Agriculture 
There were two principal planks in the agricultural sector: first, an increase in 
the supply of credit and the maintenance of minimum prices by state purchasing 
agencies, so as to boost the resources available to the farmer, and second, a massive 
increase in the import of tractors, so as to extend the cultivated area and· to raise 
production. Overall public investment in agriculture rose as a proportion of total 
public sector investments from 15.4 percent in 1950 to 27.9 percent by 1959. [Ref. 
4:p. 198] 
Peasants used their extra resource·s to purchase tractors. Turkey still had a 
good deal of cultivable but unused land after World War IT, and there was a severe 
shortage of draft power in relation to land and farm labor. 
3. Labor and Social Policy 
There was high population growth in the 1950s, as well as rural-urban 
migration .. With the 1950 census, statistics also began to be gathered on the 
breakdown of the workforce by employment status. These reforms can be seen in 
Table 2.7. 
In the educational sphere, there was a steady rise in registration at all levels of 
education. 
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Table 2.7. Economically Active Population, by Sector, 1950-1960 
1950 1960 
Employment by sector % % 
Agriculture 85.7 74.9 
Services 6.9 10.2 
Industry 7.4 9.6 
Unknown 5.0 
Wage earners 10.7 18.8 
Employers 10.7 18.8 
Unpaid family workers 62.9 47.9 
Unknown 3.8 
Source: Turkish State Planning Organization 
4. Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
The exact relationship between increases in the stock of money and rises in the 
price level in Turkey has been the subject of a great deal of highly technical 
discussion. The data from the 1950s suggest a rough, but not exact, link between 
increases in the money supply, the output of goods and servi~es and the price level. 
From 1950 to 1955, the stock of money increased by approximately 20 percent per 
annum. For the first three years, there was a steady increase in output to soak up the 
extra supply of money, and inflation was held at a low level of 3-7 percent per 
annum. But, in the second half of the period, inflation rose to 20 percent. In 1958, 
the government was forced to apply the monetary brakes, and the rate of increase in 
the money supply was reduced. Inflation nevertheless continued at a fast pace until 
1960. 
5. Foreign Trade 
During 1950-1953, there was a steady rise in exports, but this was 
accompanied by a sharp rise in the import bill, so that a large deficit on the current 
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account developed in 1952-1953. At the same time, the inflow of foreign aid also 
fell; the overall balance was only maintained by a reduction of reserves and increase 
in short-term supplies and commercial credits. Exports fell sharply during 1954-
1958, and failed to return to their 1953 level for the rest of the decade. Imports were 
also reduced, but the current account was still heavily in the red, and Turkey was 
faced with a mounting total of foreign debt. 
There are a number of factors which explain the foreign-trade fluctuations of 
the 1950s. In the 1950-1953 period, exports were aided by the surge in agricultural 
production and in the supply of export goods. However, the decline in the value of 
exports after 1953 cannot be accounted for by factors which were beyond the control 
of the Turkish government [Ref. 4:p. 43]. 
By the end of 1957, external deficits had reached a crisis point. The total 
foreign debt was at approximately the $ 1, 011 million level. 
E. IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION PERIOD AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
(1960-1978) 
With the implementation of the three five-year development plans, the 
economy continued to expand throughout this period with unprecedented growth in 
the manufacturing and service sectors. The growth rate of agriculture, although 
relatively modest, stayed consistently above that of the population, with an average 
of 3.3 percent per annum. In the early 1970s, high worker remittances, together with 
aggressive investment plans of the government, enabled the domestic output to keep 
on growing for a few more years, until the end of 1976, when the oil crisis threw the 
economy into a deep recession. Throughout the remainder of the decade, Turkey 
struggled with severe balance of payment difficulties coupled with rising inflation. 
By the end of the 1970s, the Turkish economy found itself in an economic crisis 
accompanied by political instability and social unrest. 
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Parallel to these negative developments, the economy underwent a far-reaching 
transfonnation in its structure during the same period. While the share of agriculture 
in total output (at 1968 prices) declined from 38.4 percent in 1962 to 23.3 percent in 
1977, that of the industrial sector (including manufacturing, mining, energy and 
construction) rose rapidly from 22.3 percent to 31.5 percent [Ref. 15:p. 2]. 
Nevertheless, this economic expansion did not give rise to the "expected" outcomes 
when the results obtained are compared to the international norms of the same period. 
First, the growth in manufacturing did not succeed in generating adequate 
employment opportunities to absorb the labor force released by the shrinking 
agricultural sector. Second, compared to other developing countries in the same 
income category, the share of agriculture in GNP continued to remain relatively high, 
which hampered the growth of total factor productivity. Third, in spite of this 
impressive growth record of output, the share of total gross savings in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) at 1968 prices did not show a substantial improvement and remained 
stagnant throughout this period (see Table 2.8). Fourth, international comparisons 
also reveal that exports remained well below those of other developing countries with 
similar characteristics. There was a contitiuing dominance of the public sector over 
domestic industrial production during this period, despite all the incentive programs 
directed at the private sector. 
During the 1960-1978 period, there were two maJor and interrelated 
developments in the expansion of the Turkish economy. One is the impact of five-
year development plans on industrialization and capital accumulation. The other is 
the end of the "easy stage"8 of import-substitution and the beginning of its "complex 
SOuring that period, the domestic production of most consumer nondurables and of their immediate products 
was achieved utilizing mostly unskilled labor. It came to an end because these products were mostly labor intensive 
and did not require large-scale production for efficient operations. 
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stage,"9 characterized by the replacement of imported intermediate and capital goods, 
consumer durables, and the domestic production of related technologies. The main 
thrust of the planning years originated from inward-looking import-substituting 
programs that relied heavily on public investments in both manufacturing -- through 
SEEs -- and infrastructure, and resulted in a steady growth of domestic total demand. 
Table 2.8. Sectoral Distribution of Investments and Savings 
Growth Rates ~%2 Shares in GDP at 1968 Prices ~%2 
1963-67 1968-72 1973-77 1962 1967 1972 1977 
Total gross 8.5 7.2 15.3 15.8 17.4 17.9 26.1 
investment 
private 4.8 9.1 13.1 8.6 7.8 9.0 10.5 
public 12.5 5.4 18.0 7.1 9.6 8.9 14.6 
Total gross 12.7 5.2 8.8 12.3 16.4 15.4 16.7 
savings 
private 11.9 3.6 12.2 6.7 8.6 7.5 9.3 
public 13.7 6.8 6.9 5.6 7.8 7.9 7.4 
Source: Turkish State Planning Organization 
~e complex stage of import substitution was a period (1970s) when consumer durables and the production 
of intermediate and capital goods was at stake. Because the production of these goods depends critically on the 
implementation ofhigh technology and the use ofhighly skilled labor, the deficiencies in labor training, technology 
adaption, and management had very strong negative effects on efficiency and productivity growth. 
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ID. THE NEW POLICY OUTLOOK AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
A. EMERGENCE OF EXTERNAL PRESSURES (DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE 1978-1980 PERIOD) 
The Turkish economy ran into a serious foreign-exchange crisis between 1978 
and 1980, concomitant with its failure to meet the debt servicing obligations on its 
outstanding foreign debt. Although the indicators on this debt were moderate, its 
short-term liabilities aggravated the debt profile. By 1977, its short-term liabilities 
had come to constitute 57.9 percent of its total outstanding debt. 
The negative real interest rates charged by international banks on loans offered 
to developing countries in the years following the first oil crisis (1973) had served as 
a pitfall in which a large number of developing countries were entrapped between the 
end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. 
Because of easy borrowing, Turkey's outstanding foreign debt almost tripled 
over a period of three years-- from $4.7 billion to $13.8 billion between 1975 and 
1978. The IMF entered the scene in 1978, drawing up a two-year standby agreement 
in accordance with its conditionality stipulations but with no success; hence there 
were no fresh funds forthcoming. Turkey was strangled by a foreign-exchange 
shortage and was thus gripped with stagnation and shortages of basic necessities. 
Turkey undertook to reduce public sector deficits, to reduce public sector borrowing 
from the Central Bank, which meant a ceiling on domestic credit, and to respect limits 
set on new foreign borrowing. In March 1978, prior to the signing of the standby 
agreement, a 23 percent devaluation of TL against the US$ had already been made. 
This agreement opened the way to debt rescheduling and consolidation negotiations 
between Turkey and its creditors. By September 1978, it had become evident that 
Turkey was going to exceed the limits on domestic credit set out in the standby 
agreement. The appeal by Turkey for a revision of the performance criteria of 
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standby was accepted by the IMF. Despite this, Turkey was still unable to meet the 
limits and the agreement lost its force by the end of the year. [Ref. 16:p. 75] 
Turkey and the IMF had completely different views regarding failure of the 
stabilization efforts envisaged by the standby agreement. The Turkish authorities 
thought that the failure was due to production bottlenecks caused by the import 
constraints that the economy was facing and the reluctance of the creditor to extend 
debt relief and new credit to Turkey. The IMF believed that failure was inevitable 
because the TL was still grossly overvalued and that the government was not really 
trying to open up the economy. According to the Turkish authorities, the current 
situation was tempormy, caused by excessive short-term borrowing carried out during 
the 1975-1977 period. If debt relief and new lending were to be extended, Turkey 
could resume the import substitution strategies in force since the 1960s and a 
permanent way out of the crisis would be found. The IMF believed that Turkey's 
problem was the import substitution strategy, and the permanent solution to the crisis 
was the abandonment of such policies in favor of outward oriented strategies after a 
period of stabilization. Turkey should immediately begin with institutional and 
economic reforms to back these outward oriented strategies. [Ref. 16:p. 76] 
From the standpoint of oil-importing indebted countries, the following year 
was marked by a worsening of the conditions in the international market after a new 
rise in oil prices. Import shortages were more severe and inflation was even higher 
than in 1978. At this stage, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries stepped 
in, and under pressure from these countries, the IMF entered the stage a second time 
and a new one year standby agreement was signed in April 1979. A 44 percent 
devaluation was undertaken in June 1979. Debt relief negotiations resumed and fresh 
funds from the OECD, the European Economic Community (EEC), and the World 
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Bank became available. This increased availability of funds was insufficient, 10 
however, in the face of unprecedented oil price increases along with increases in 
prices of other imported inputs, output losses and inflation continued. It also became 
clear that standby limits on domestic credit were going to be exceeded. Turkey 
succeeded in converting a part of its private short-term liabilities into long-term public 
liabilities and somewhat stretching out the maturity term of the latter. 
Under these circumstances the Suleyman Demirel government took office in 
November 1979. The economic policies marking the period with 1980 came into 
effect in the wake of the government's realization that unless Turkey resorted a second 
time to debt rescheduling, it was doomed to failure in meeting its debt obligations. 
Unless ample fresh funds were forthcoming, the domestic economy was likely to 
become unmanageable. As Turkey's creditworthiness had shifted to an all-time low, 
it could no longer borrow from international banks which had revised lending policies 
to cooperate with the IMF. [Ref. 17:pp. 336-343] 
At the end of this two year process, the main features of which are touched 
upon above, Turkey had decided to make the adjustments required for a closer 
integration with the Western economic system, as expounded in the policy advice of 
the IMF and the World Bank. Western sources of finance had shown their 
determination not to finance new bursts of development based on "old strategies". 
Two unsuccessful standby agreements over a period of two years must be viewed 
against the background of this phenomenon. In the final analysis, Western sources 
of finance had the final say and Turkey reached the structural adjustment decisions. 
[Ref. 16:p. 77] 
100ut of the $989.3 million pledged by the OECD Aid Consortium Countries, only $253.7 million were 
disbursed and Saudi Arabia's pledge went unfulfilled. 
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B. ADOPTION OF A NEW POLICY IN THE ECONOMY 
Faced with the most severe economic crisis in the history of the republic, the 
Demirel government finally realized the need to undertake fundamental reforms that 
would alter the structure of the Turkish economy. On January 24, 1980, the 
government initiated a major change in the orientation of economic policy and 
introduced a major and comprehensive economic stabilization package. Behind the 
package was Turgut Ozal, a powerful technocrat in the position of Undersecretary of 
the Prime Minist:ty. However, even key ministers had been unaware of the scope of 
the plan outside their own domain; they were asked to sign a variety of decrees and 
had no advance information as to what other components of the program would be. 
The Demirel government drafted this program in perfect recognition of 
Turkey's constraints and of the revision expected in its policy stance by international 
creditor. The program's aim was to pledge to the OECD consortium, the World Bank, 
and the IMF Turkey? s intent to implement new policies. Expectations were that their 
approval would be secured for a new debt rescheduling and the extension of fresh 
funds. The government thus committed itself to the realization of an outward-
oriented, free-market economy at a time when its bargaining power was at its lowest 
and when it had no other choice but to accept those policies perennially proposed to 
indebted countries in difficulty. [Ref. 18:pp. 59-81] 
Simultaneously, the government entered into negotiations with the IMF and 
other official and unofficial creditors. Negotiations with the Fund resulted in a three-
year standby agreement in June 1980. However, because of the political weakness 
of the minority government, which was not able to elect a president of the republic 
after months-long sessions in Parliament, political and economic turmoil continued 
until the military intervened in September 1980. The military quickly formed a 
civilian government and put Ozal in charge of continuing the implementation and 
strengthening the already introduced reform program. Later in 1980, the standby 
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agreement with the Fund, and in particular the strength of the underlying economic 
program, helped convince the OECD governments to reschedule principal and interest 
payments falling due between 1980 and 1983 for ten years. Eventually, in 1981, the 
banks agreed to extend the maturities of the rescheduled bank debts for a seven year 
period. 
Ozal served as Deputy Prime Minister from September 1980 until a bank and 
brokerage house crisis in 1982 led him to resign. The military leaders blamed Ozal's 
minister of finance, K. Erdem, for the crisis. As financial deregulation arid interest 
rate liberalization were the main issues of Ozal's program, he took responsibility and 
resigned from office [Ref. 7:p. 46]. 
In 1982, after a rewritten constitution was approved by a vast majority in a 
referendum, the first general election under the new constitution was scheduled to be 
held in the spring of 1983. In this election, Ozal's new Motherland Party (MP) won 
the election with a comfortable majority, and he resumed office as Prime Minister in 
1983. He immediately picked up the banner of the January 1980 reform program to 
push through some major and ambitious additional policy measures. The new Ozal 
government was determined to attack the sources of the ·economic crisis where 
previous attempts at reform had only sought to deal with the symptoms. 
· Stability was the first and immediate goal. One of the fundamental issues of 
a free-market economy is the ability to establish and maintain relative price 
equilibrium. To achieve this goal, it was necessary to remove imbalances in relative 
prices in the commodity, labor, financial and capital markets. Imbalances in the 
commodity markets originated largely from the pricing policies of the state 
enterprises. These imbalances were aggravated by discrepancies and inconsistencies 
in import regulations. Imbalances in the labor markets derived from policies affecting 
taxation, income distribution and wages. Finally, imbalances in the financial and 
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capital markets originated from the extensive state intervention in the financial sector. 
Moreover, uncertainties in government put an even greater strain on these balances. 
Structural transformation was the second goal. As a developing countly in 
need of regaining international credibility, Turkey focused on a program that sought 
to achieve balance of payment viability over the medium term. The ultimate target 
of the restructuring was to enter onto a path of self-sustaining growth. Based on these 
two interrelated objectives, the government's policies were designed to correct 
distortions, inefficiencies, and supply rigidities in the domestic economy developed 
during the long years of financial repression by restoring market signals as a principal 
guide to economic policy decisions. This would also allow rapid adjustment to 
external developments. The reforms chosen to achieve these goals fall into two 
categories: institutional reforms and policy-oriented reforms [Ref. 7:pp. 34-59]. 
1. Institutional Reforms 
The governments institutional reforms are aimed at achieving a better, more 
unified, efficient, coherent, responsive, productive, and timely process of econorrnc 
decision making and execution throughout the economy, from central government to 
the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) to the private sector. Efficient decision 
making was, before the reforms, one of Turkey's scarcest resources. As a first step, 
the traditional organizational structure of the Ministly of Finance was broken down 
and the Treasury Department was subsumed into the Ministly of Finance in 1983. 
A new Undersecretariat ofTreasmy and Foreign Trade was created, reporting directly 
to the Prime Minister's office. In this way, the prime minister consolidated under his 
direction all the major agencies of economic and financial management. 
A new Money and Credit Committee was established to discuss policy issues. 
The Economic Coordination Council was the corresponding political forum, headed 
by the prime minister and attended by some of the key ministers and technocrats. 
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These institutions were considered short-cuts to the long political decision making 
process [Ref. 7:pp. 43-44]. 
2. Policy Oriented Reforms 
Trade Liberalization: The principal trade reforms included the elimination of 
quantitative controls on imports, such as the quota and licensing system; replacement 
of the positive import list11 with a negative list12; replacement of nontariff with tariff 
barriers; and a gradual reduction of levels of protection [Ref. 7:pp. 60-92]. 
Liberalization of the exchange control regime: The country's conservative and 
rigid exchange control system dated back to the early years of the republic. Before 
1980 a Turkish citizen could be penalized for having a single US dollar in his pocket. 
With this reform, Turkish citizens are free to open savings accounts in any foreign 
currency and to transfer funds from these accounts anywhere in the world without 
restriction. In addition, investors in the Istanbul Stock Exchange may freely move 
money in and out of the country. 
Exchange rates: Reform of the exchange rate policy was one of the key 
decisions of the reform program. A gradual process of freeing the exchange rate was 
applied, beginning with mini-devaluations and later moving to daily adjustments, and 
finally, to market-determined exchange rates. 
Export orientation: A new set of tools and institutions were introduced for 
export promotion. Exporters were allowed to import their inputs at world prices in 
order to be able to compete worldwide. An export-import bank (Eximbank) was 
established, and an export insurance scheme was introduced to cover country risks. 
[Ref. 7:p. 72] 
11Which specified those goods that could be imported, with all others proscribed. 
12Which listed only the imports proscribed, allowing all others. 
37 
Financial-sector deregulation and reforms: Freeing of interest rates was the 
main policy decision aimed at boosting the rate of saving. In a depressed market with 
negative interest rates, this policy increased monetization of the economy. However, 
without efficient regulation and supervision, this situation first created an oligopolistic 
reaction from the banking system and led to a financial crisis when a major brokerage 
house went under. In the wake of this crisis, financial reforms were institutionalized 
in a new legislation governing commercial banking, the Central Bank, and the stock 
exchange and other capital markets. For the first time a deposit insurance system was 
introduced. Elimination of entry restrictions attracted many foreign banks into 
Turkey, and this enhanced competition in the sector. 
Fiscal reforms: The introduction of a value-added tax in place of nine different 
taxes was the key reform in the fiscal area. Elimination of price controls applying to 
both state enterprises and the private sector, and elimination of subsidies in the public 
sectors were other important achievements. 
Foreign direct investment: Although Turkey has had one of the developing 
world's most liberal foreign direct investment laws since 1954, its implementation 
was conservative. The bureaucracy's negative effect toward foreign investment was 
minimized with some new elements which were introduced to attract direct 
investments. 
Privatization: The privatization program, which is still under way, is a 
necessary element of the new economic policy and part of a wide-ranging program 
of structural transformation ofthe Turkish economy. The government's main goal in 
privatizing its State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) is to make the economy more 
responsive to market forces. The role of the government is to be confined to areas 
where the private sector cannot or will not enter because of profitability 
considerations, or where the services provided are in the nature of essential public 
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goods. 13 This policy is not merely a solution to the problems of SEEs; it is also 
intended to increase competition and productivity throughout the economy. 
There are some reasons why the privatization program has not been 
accomplished. First, the program was slow to get underway. The amount of 
preparation required was frequently underestimated. Second, the institutional 
arrangements were unsuitable and inefficient in the early stages. What was needed 
was a single independent agency with strong political support. With the high 
unemployment rate, people are not yet convinced of the merits of privatization. 
Third, the legal system has to be fortified to inspire confidence in international 
investors. Lastly, the issue of privatization has been overpoliticized. An effort to 
depoliticize the issue is called for, because the government's vulnerability to political 
attack is reducing its efficiency and creating problems for the successful 
implementation of the rest of the economic program. 
Infrastructure: The existing infrastructure had no ability to serve the new 
economic growth program. Energy, transportation and telecommunications 
investments were given top priority. 
C. STEPS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
1. Stabilization (1980-1983) 
a. Economic Policy Tools 
From 1980 until the end of 1985, substantial official credits were 
extended to Turkey by the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD Aid Consortium 
Countries.14 In addition, with the IMF endorsement of the program, Saudi Arabia, the 
Islamic Bank, the OPEC Fund and the European Settlement Fund also contributed to 
13Li.ke defense, health care, education and infrastructure. 
14The IMF loaned $1.2 billion with an additional $225 million in 1984, the World Bank $1.6 billion in five 
structural adjustment loans, and the OECD Aid Consortium Countries $4.6 billion between 1980 and 1985. 
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support stabilization package. The yearly average for current-account deficit reached 
3.3 percent of GNP while the non-interest current account ran a deficit of the order 
of I percent of GNP. This massive official support had a large effect in the redressal 
of the economy. 
The substantiation of a free-market economy called for a substantial 
reduction in the government's role ill direct productive activity and its intervention 
in the price mechanism. The government was to confme its economic activity to 
undertaking infrastructure investments, in particular in energy production. There was 
to be an overall deregulation in all markets while agricultural price supports, 
including subsidies to inputs, were by and large to be eliminated. 
The inflation rate was to be reduced by strict control of the money 
supply. The money market was to be regulated so as to permit the formation of 
positive real interest rates. Direct controls over foreign trade and the foreign-exchange 
market were to be relaxed. As a first step, the crawling peg system was to be adopted 
following a substantial devaluation of the Turkish Lira (TL). Additionally, the 
multiple exchange rates were to cede their first place to a uniform rate, and the 
clearing agreement with Soviet Union was to be replaced by payments in convertible 
currencies. The Central Bank was to be conferred as the jurisdiction to run the 
system. Measures were to be taken for promoting the inflow of foreign direct 
investments to offset the reduction in domestic investments, and controls over capital 
inflows were to be lifted. In addition, in order to transform the inward-looking 
economic structure to an outward-orientated one, other measures -- institutional or 
monetary -- were to be taken so that exports could expand. Debt management 
institutions were to be strengthened. [Ref. 19:pp. 165-187] 
The foregoing measures brought into effect through a heavy reliance on 
relative price changes to engender the expected structural transformation in the 
economy. First, domestic demand was substantially curtailed to bring down the 
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inflation rate and to promote exports. Domestic terms of trade were shifted against 
agriculture by way of manipulating agricultural price support policy and imports. 
Thus, in real terms per capita income in agriculture could be lowered. Labor union 
rights to strike and employer union rights to lay off workers were suspended, and a 
militant trade-union federation was banned from activity. In state economic 
enterprises, wages were brought under control by substituting a so called 
"Coordination Committee" instead of collective bargaining; the salaries of 
government employees could be directly adjusted in accordance with requirements 
via budgetary allocations; the prices of public goods and services were raised so that 
the supplying state enterprises could reap substantial profits. High positive real 
interest rates, plus real devaluations, also contributed to the curtailment of domestic 
demand. 
In restructuring the economy towards outward-orientation, the major 
economic policy tools implemented relied on r~ductions in income and consumption 
by social classes making their livelihood out of labor income or, as in the case of 
agricultural producers of a meager mixed income. The investment rate, however, was 
sustained at its previous level of around 20 percent of GNP. 
Second, the foreign-exchange and trade regimes were substantially 
liberalized. Instead of the previous officially fixed exchange-rate system, the 
crawling peg system was introduced in May 1981, based on daily adjustments of the 
foreign exchange rate by the Central Bank. The commercial banks were to follow this 
central rate, with rates to be fixed within a narrow band around the former. This 
system helped eliminate the overvaluation in the TL and reduce the gap between the 
official rate and the black-market rate through constant adjustments- according to 
differences in inflation rates at home and abroad, changes in foreign terms of trade, 
movements in the current account deficit etc. It also permitted the undertaking of 
ample real devaluations without making it a public issue. In effect, the index of the 
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real effective exchange rate ofthe TL declined from 145.3 in 1979 (May 1981=100) 
to 80.3 in 1983; that is, its value declined by 45 percent in real terms. Tax rebates 
provided a further incentive to export orientation. In addition, the previous prohibitive 
approach to imports was altered, even if import liberalization was postponed to the 
second period. 
Third, interest rates were deregulated by mid-1980. However, by mid-
1983 this implementation had to be discontinued. This is because of the outbreak of 
a serious financial crisis in the money market in 1982 which ended in the collapse of 
a large number of (deposit collecting-money lending) private loan institutions along 
with some small private banks. The savings of many low-income or middle-income 
urban savers -- most of them retired persons -- were lost in consequence, causing 
great hardship. In consequence, centralized control of money markets and the 
banking system was reintroduced. Nonetheless, the commitment to sustaining positive 
real interest rates were also observed by official authorities, the Ministry of Finance. 
Underlying the high positive real interest rates was the strict control exercised by the 
IMF on the money supply, primarily by limiting credits extended by the Central Bank 
to the public sector. [Ref. 17:p. 354] 
These radical policy alterations lacked a radical tax reform to increase 
government fiscal revenue. Whatever change did take place in the tax system was 
orientated to alleviating the tax burden on income from capital and to shifting the 
burden of taxation from direct to indirect taxes. The policy makers of the military 
regime had adopted the supply-side economics approach to taxation as a means to 
boost business activity. 
With these policies, significant changes occurred in the functional 
distribution of domestic net-factor income in favor of capital at the expense 
agricultural income, as well as income from labor. 
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b. Performance Indicators of the Stabilization Period 
The unique advantages that Turkey enjoyed in the neighboring countries 
and within its domestic economy, accompanied by economic policy tools, led to a 
notable improvement in basic performance indicators. Table 3.1 gives data about 
some performance indicators during the stabilization period. 
Table 3.1. Turkish Economic Indicators, 1979-1983 
Real GDP (billions of 1968 TL) 
Growth rate 
Real investment (billions of 1988 TL) 
Private 
Public 
Index of industrial output (1986 = 1 00) 
Exports (billions of US$) 
Imports (billions ofUS$) 
Current account deficit 














































First, exports doubled between 1979 and 1983 --from $2.26 billion to 
$5.73 billion-- notwithstanding the considerable appreciation in the value of the US 
dollar. The current account deficit -- including 1980 -- hovered around a yearly 
average of3.3 percent of GNP, permitting a considerable expansion in imports. This 
was crucial in view of the import bottlenecks faced in raising manufacturing output 
prior to 1980. Thus idle capacity in the industrial sector could easily be mobilized, 
on the other hand, to export expansion creating the required demand for its output 
and, on the other to import, expansion supplying its inputs. After the drop in 
manufacturing output in 1979 and 1980, output picked up again and the annual 
growth rate averaged 7.4 percent, from 1981 through 1983. The performance of 
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agriculture, however turned out to be quite poor due to a deterioration in its domestic 
and international terms of trade; its growth rate for the same years averaged out to a 
mere 0. 7 percent per annum. GNP growth, although below the rate in normal years, 
increased to 4.5 percent per annum between 1981 and 1983. That is, export expansion 
dragged back an upward growth performance. 
When looked at in terms of US dollar estimates, the picture was 
different; Turkey turned out to be one of the two middle-income countries, together 
with Argentina, whose per capita income declined by about 7-8 percent in the first 
half of the 1980s -- from $1,330 in 1979 to $1,270 by 1983. Substantial real 
devaluations, added to the deterioration in Turkey's international terms of trade, 
worsened the relative income position of the population. Given the large shifts in the 
fimctional distribution of income against agricultural producers, as well as wage and 
salary earners, economic hardship mounted for the majority of the lower-income 
social classes. It was, by and large, receivers of income from capital, whose share 
jumped from 38 percent of domestic income in 1978 to 54.7 percent in 1983 who 
benefited from these policies. Within this group the large industrial conglomerates 
with a foreign trading company and commercial bank participation were especially 
favored. 
Second, Turkey's outstanding debt profile improved considerably to 
debt rescheduling. Whereas in 1977 and 1978, 57.8 percent and ·52 percent 
respectively of total outstanding debt consisted of (private) short-term debt, this ratio 
remained as low as 12 percent until the end if 1983. But the other debt indicators 
worsened: the debt/GNP ratio jumped from 28 percent in 1980 to 35.6 percent in 
1983 because of laggard GNP growth in US dollars and, notwithstanding the 
substantial expansion in exports, the debt service/exports of goods and services ratio 
jumped from 22.7 percent to 29.5 percent during the same years. Turkey's total 
outstanding debt went up from $14.23 billion in 1979 to $18.3 billion in 1983. 
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Throughout this perio~ Turkey benefited from net resource transfers from abroad; the 
non-interest current account deficit amounted to 1 percent of GNP which facilitated 
the attainment of the targets set. The international reserves/imports ratio also 
improve~ increasing from a mere 15.9 percent in 1979 to 22.7 percent by 1983. In 
consequence, Turkey was able to regain creditworthiness in international markets 
towards the middle of the decade at a time when, following the outbreak of the debt 
crisis in Latin America, many developing countries had lost theirs. 
Thir~ there were also substantial achievements in the monetaty domain. 
In the pre-1980 crisis years inflation had accelerated, accompanied first by a decline 
in the GNP growth rate but finally ending up in a negative growth rate in 1979; in this 
latter year the wholesale price increase index rose to 60.3 percent while GNP growth 
dropped to -1.1 percent. This stagflationary trend continued in 1980 with a further 
rise in prices to 107.2 percent per annum and a further decline in GNP by 2.9 percent. 
But the shock therapy policies implemented worked efficiently and pulled the 
inflation rate down to an average of 30 percent per annlJil\ while the GNP growth rate 
turned positive, at an average of 4.5 percent per annlJil\ between 1981 and 1983. Real 
positive interest rates helped channel financial savings which, at that time, were 
mainly deposits in commercial banks. This shift also helped dampen the inflation rate, 
even though the overall domestic saving rate dropped by a few percentage points. 
Finally, some crucial steps were taken towards reducing state 
intervention in the economy. Price subsidies to state economic enterprises and 
agriculture were substantially reduced, whereas they were increased for exports of 
manufactures; price controls, previously exercised on a large number of goods, were 
either reduced or completely lifted. The foregoing policies did not work smoothly as 
soon as they were implemented. As the decision making process had become totally 
centralized, policies went into effect with a trial-and-error methodology and the 
outcome was an atmosphere of constant change. 
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2. Liberalization (1984-1991) 
a. Economic Policy Tools 
The period beginning with 1984 is characterized by efforts to liberalize 
further the goods, foreign exchange, money and capital markets and to ensme the 
integration of the economy into regional trading blocks as well as the international 
economy.15 
Beginning with 1984, the transition to a more liberalized import regime 
was initiated with the abolishment of the prohibitive approach to imports. Nominal 
tariff protection was substantially reduced: the arithmetic average of rates dropped 
from 76.3 percent to 48.9 percent. The outstanding featme of the import liberalization 
process was the substitution of price levies in lieu of bmeaucratic controls and 
quantitative restrictions. Initially, in order to protect some of the domestic industries, 
import smcharges played a crucial role together with tariffs and real devaluations. 
[Ref. 20:pp. 9-36] In 1989 and 1990 both tariff rates and import smcharges were 
reduced further; however, in early 1992, on the advent to power of the coalition 
government, both were raised on some specific products to protect domestic 
productive sectors. By the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, imports had been 
liberalized up to a rate of 94 percent. This rendered meaningful the application to the 
IMF for the endorsement of the convertibility of the TL (Tmkish Lira). 
The liberalization of imports was followed by reductions of tax rebates 
on exports because they conflicted with the stipulations of the GATT subsidy code --
of which Tmkey is a signatory -- and since they gave rise to fictitious exports. 
reductions commenced in 1986 and the system was discontinued from 1988. The 
Eximbank was instituted in 1987 with the purpose of financing foreign operations, 
15 Along with associate membership of the European Community (EC) and European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), Turkey holds full membership in a number of regional organizations such as the Economic Cooperation 
Organization, The Black Sea Regional Economic Cooperation Organization, and the Islamic Conference. 
Organization. 
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and an export insurance system was instituted in 1989 to help reduce exporters' risk 
exposure. 
Liberalization of the foreign-exchange market accompanied the 
foregoing changes. Residents and non-residents were allowed to open foreign 
currency deposit accounts with commercial banks by the end of 1985. In 1988 and 
1989 the foreign-exchange and gold markets were instituted and capital-account 
transactions were liberalized. In August 1990 market-determined prices for foreign 
exchange replaced the Central Bank-determined prices, the system which had been 
in effect since May 1981. 
The foregoing policy changes and institutionalization processes were 
paralleled by similar moves in the money and capital markets. In the autumn of 1988 
the Central Bank freed commercial bank deposit rates; the free setting of non-
preferential lending rates had remained in effect since the early 1980s. From April 
1986, an interbank money market started operations. In early 1987 the Central Bank 
initiated open market operations and from 1986 onwards started to prepare monetary 
programs, targeting M216 unti11990 and from then on a monetary aggregate called the 
"Central Bank money". 
The capital-market board had been established as early as 1981 but had 
remained inoperational. It was only with the institution of the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange in 1986 that capital market operations became meaningful. The reliance of 
the government in office on domestic borrowing-- beginning with 1985 -- rather than 
tax revenue increases to meet budget expenditures fed enough material to keep the 
market going. In addition, the start of the privatization of public enterprises in 1986, 
by floating their shares on the market, contributed to the same end. Private 
corporations, squeezed by high real interest rates on bank credits, followed suit so as 
16Broad money; net of liabilities (to residents and emigrants) denominated in foreign currency; currency and 
coins, checking deposits, and saving deposits in commercial banks. 
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to obtain access to cheaper finance. On the liberalization of the capital account 
transactions, beginning with 1989, foreign portfolio capital inflows were also added 
to the list. By early 1990s, capital market operations had become a part of daily life. 
Turkey had passed a liberal law in the early 1950s to attract foreign 
direct investments, but the total amount invested until the end of the 1970s remained 
meager. From the early 1980s measures were taken to ease the red tape associated 
with the issuing of permits. Furthermore, the revision in the laws related to oil 
exploration, and to the encouragement of the tourism industry, as well as the 
government decree encouraging foreign direct investments introduced a much more 
liberal approach to the operation of foreign capital in the domestic economy. This was 
furthered by the 1985law on the establishment of Free Zones in several parts of the 
country. Free border trade with the neighboring country residents, encouragement of 
foreign banks to open branches etc. all point to the degree of government commitment 
to outward-orientation. This policy has also beeil valid for domestic capital so that · 
Turkish business persons have been undertaking a wide variety of economic activities 
abroad in a large number of countries. 
The liberalization of trade union activity commenced in the last months 
of the military regime and went into effect on the advent to power of the civilian 
government in the autumn of 1983. New revised laws for trade unions and collective 
bargaining were passed, and previously suspended rights of collective bargaining and 
to strike were restored by 1984. The abolition of coordination committee, however, 
came later in 1987. From 1988 more freedom was granted to trade unions and real 
wage increases became the rule. 
However, taxation policy continued to remain a lame duck of the policy 
package implemented in this period. An important step -- in the way of adapting 
indirect taxes to EC policies -- was taken by putting into effect the value-added tax 
in 1985 and abolishing outmoded indirect taxes. The tax revision undertaken in 1987 
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aggravated the tax burden on wage workers and government employees. This was 
followed by steps to increase the tax burden on income from capital by restoring the 
withholding tax17 on interest income from TL, foreign-currency deposits and 
government internal borrowing papers. 
The fact that an increasing surplus on the non-interest current account 
was targeted by the government implied that the domestic saving rate would have to 
be raised, in comparison with the previous period, given the investment rate. 
Additionally, since the burden of foreign-debt servicing fell, by and large, on the 
public sector, the government would have to be able to lay hands on an increasing 
proportion of domestic savings. Furthermore, in order to boost economic growth, the 
government had to sustain public investment but abstain from being involved in 
directly productive domains. Thus, it had to confine its investment activity to 
infrastructure in order to abide by its pledge to privatize economic activity. 
The domestic saving rate was raised, in part, via real positive interest 
rates on financial assets and, in part, by the redistribution in income in favor of high 
income capital owners through inflation and other policies. Since government tax 
revenue increases -- as a means of forced savings -- displayed an elasticity coefficient 
around unity with respect to GNP growth, from 1985 domestic borrowing was 
resorted to in order to transfer a part of increasing private savings to the public sector. 
Sale of government securities and treaswy bonds, by and large to commercial banks, 
has been the basic means by which this transfer takes place. Together, these changes 
have endangered three undesirable outcomes which are closely related to each other: 
1. high real interest rates (on commercial bank credits), 
2. the. stepping up of the inflation rate from 1985 onwards, and 
3. increasing inequality in income distribution. 
17 Abolished in the early 1980s. 
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b. Performance Indicators of the Liberalization Period 
The second period of the implementation of the restructuring program 
basically may be divided into two subperiods. In the first subperiod, which lasted 
from 1984 through 1987, most of the economic performance indicators improved 
compared to the previous period. However, in the second subperiod covering the 
years 1988 through 1991, not only did they worsen, but there was also extreme 
fmancial instability in the foreign exchange, capital and money markets. The 
surviving economy of the first subperiod ceded its place to a stagflationary process. 
Table 3.2 states performance of the Turkish economy after 1984. 
Table 3.2. Economic Performance after 1984 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Real GNP (trillions of 
1985 TL) 26.4 27.8 30.0 32.3 33.5 34.1 37.3 38.0 
Change :from preceding 
year(%) 6.0 5.3 7.9 7.7 3.7 1.8 9.4 1.9 
Investment (trillions of 
TL) 4.8 5.8 7.3 8.7 8.4 8.1 10.3 11.1 
Exports of goods and 
services (billions of 
US$) 7.4 8.3 7.6 10.3 11.9 11.8 13.0 13.7 
Imports of goods and 
services (billions of 
US$) 10.3 11.2 10.7 13.6 13.7 16.0 22.6 21.0 
Current account balance 
(billions of US$) -1.4 -1.0 -1.5 -0.8 1.6 0.9 -2.6 0.3 
Sources: [Ref. 7], appendix tables; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 1992; OECD, Economic Outlook (June 1992). 
From 1984 through 1987 GNP growth (7.3 percent per annum), saving 
and investment rates in GNP (20.3 percent and 22.4 p·ercent per annum respectively) 
and growth rates_in agriculture and manufacturing (2.0 percent and 8.9 percent per 
annum respectively) improved noticeably compared to the previous period. 
Additionally, not only did the current account deficit -- as a percentage of GNP --
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substantially decline (:from -3.3 percent to -2.2 percent per annum), but the economy 
also started to yield a surplus on the non-interest current account. That is, the net 
resource inflow of the previous period gradually ceded its place to net resource 
transfers abroad. International reserve holdings almost tripled to meet more than 2.5 
percent of yearly imports. There were also substantial improvements on a sectoral 
basis: the public sector deficit between public savings and investments declined, as 
a proportion of GNP, while the surplus in the private sector increased. 
Export growth rate could be sustained at almost the same rate as in the 
previous period; exports jumped from $5.7 billion in 1983 to $10.3 billion in 1987. 
However, a part of the increase was fictitious. Export values were inflated to benefit 
from the tax-rebate system. This fraudulent activity was one of the underlying reasons 
for the termination of the system by 1988. The composition of exports went on 
changing in favor of manufactures in the course of rapid export expansion; its share 
reached 79.2 percent in 1987, compared to 63.9 percent in 1983. 
On the other hand, some important indicators considerably worsened. 
Firs~ some foreign debt indicators reached all-time peaks: the foreign debt/resource 
ratio18 almost doubled-- from 24.8 percent in 1980 to 35.6 percent in 1987; second, 
the real effective exchange rate of the TL went on deteriorating and the index dropped 
to 64.5 (May 1981=100) by 1987 from 80.3 in 1983; third, the average annual rate of 
inflation jumped from 31.1 percent in the previous period to 41.5 percent. The 
persistent worsening of income distribution, despite a considerable improvement in 
the performance of the economy and in some basic indicators as well as the ongoing 
democratization process, was perhaps the most striking feature of this subperiod. The 
change in the shares of agriculture, wages and salaries as well as capital income in the 
functional distribution of net domestic product followed the same trend as in the 
previous period; that is, about 85 percent of the active population hardly benefited 
18The foreign debt/resource ratio is a weighted average of the debt GNP and debt service/export ratios. 
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from the improvement in economic performance. The share of capital income went 
on climbing relentlessly and claimed 62.2 percent of net domestic factor income by 
1987. Inadequate domestic demand turned out to be crucial factor curtailing private 
investments and manufacturing output in the following years. The economy had been 
choked by high real devaluations, high real positive interest rates and sharp drops in 
the real incomes of the majority of the working population. 
Beginning with 1988, the economy entered a stagflationary stage and 
most of the performance indicators started to deteriorate. Some exogenous factors 
were added on to the endogenous factors and worsened economic conditions in the 
domestic market. For two successive years, substantial surpluses in the current 
account of approximately $1.6 billion in 1988 and $1.0 billion in 1989 involved 
considerable net resource transfers abroad; the ratio of non-interest current account 
surplus to GNP attaining 6.2 percent and 4.9 percent respectively. Seemingly, 
stagflation plus the heavy deterioration in income distribution and these surpluses 
were two facets of the same process. The index of real effective exchange rate of TL, 
which hit a rock bottom value of 62.5 (May 1981=100) in 1988, was permitted to 
appreciate in the foreign exchange market in the following year to ease the pressure 
on available resources. The index went up to 68.2 with a substantial inflow of foreign 
direct investments and portfolio capital: $1.5 billion in 1988 and $2.25 billion in 
1989. The current account surpluses, plus capital inflows, permitted to repayment of 
a part of short-term debts, while the appreciation in the TL permitted to a drop in the 
debt/resource ratio: the former came down to 14 percent of total outstanding foreign 
debt and the latter to 42.5 percent. 
Performance indicators, other than those pertaining to the current 
account and foreign debts, considerably worsened in these two years: exports 
stagnated at around $11.6 billion, GNP growth dropped to 1.5 percent and 0.9 
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percent, while the inflation rate almost doubled to 75.4 percent and 68.8 percent in 
1988 and 1989 respectively. Both agriculture and manufacturing stagnated. 
In 1990, policies were revised to reduce the rate of inflation and to ease 
pressure on available resources. The TL was allowed to appreciate in value further 
through promoting capital inflow by sustaining a high real interest rate through 
monetary restraint. The real effective exchange rate index of the TL went up to 76.5, 
the inflation rate dropped to 60.4 percent, GNP growth rose to 9.2 percent; so did 
growth rates for agriculture and manufacturing while employment expanded. 
Notwithstanding the appreciation in the TL, exports also expanded by 10 percent, 
reaching $12.96 billion. Income distribution, beginning with 1989, started to turn in 
favor of wages/salaries as organized labor pressed for high wages: the share of this 
factor income, after the dip in 1988 (18.2 percent) reached 21.7 percent and that of 
agriculture 18.9 percent, while the share of capital income dropped to 59.4 percent 
of net domestic capital income. 
The foregoing improvements were obtained by an unsustainable deficit 
in the current account: this reached 3 percent of GNP while the non-interest current 
account surplus dropped to 0.7 percent. But with the appreciation of TL, the 
debt/resource ratio came down to 36.7 percent. 
In 1991, perfonnance indicators reverted to their 1988 and 1989 values; 
that is, GNP growth rate dropped to around 0.3 percent, the inflation rate went up to 
71.4 percent and the public sector deficit reached an all-time high of 10.5 percent of 
GNP. The functional income distribution continued its amelioration in favor of wages 
and salaries-- 23.6 percent of net factor income-- but this time it was agriculture 
which lost its share (16.9 percent). The appreciation in TL in the foreign exchange 
market ceded its place to a small real depreciation, and the deficit in the current 
account gave way to a surplus; exports expanded by 7.6 percent while imports 
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contracted by 5.9 percent. The non-interest current account surplus is expected to be 
around 3 .5 percent of GNP and that of the current account around 1 percent. 
The picture drawn ofthe subperiod 1988-1991leads to the conclusion 
that economic policies ran into difficulties in striking internal and external 
equilibrium at one and the same time. It seemed that the one could be ensured only 
at the expense of the other. 
The following tables give detailed information about some variables of 
the Turkish economy in the 1980s. These tables may create a better understanding 
of the consequences of the economic reforms of the period. 


















1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990" 
76 111 163 225 367 522 674 857 1,422 2,121 4,168 
104 42 28 29 51 41 30 39 66 65 59 
432 432 488 509 527 522 505 499 512 473 473 
30 36 36 36 55 62 62 66 87 85 65 
-89 -5 4 2 9 18 13 -14 -16 7 
25 23 18 23 21 19 21 22 21 23 24 
4.0 2.6 1.7 2.6 5.3 2.8 3.6 4.4 3.8 4.4 4.1 
Sources: [Ref. 7], rows 1 and 3 from table 9; row 2 from table 12; row 4 from table 16; and row 5 from 
data appendix, table 10. Rows 6 and 7 from Central Bank ofTurkey,Annual Reports (1987, 1989, 1991). 
"Data for 1990 are not always comparable to those for earlier years. Most are derived from 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, and the percentage changes from 1989 
and 1990 were linked to the data from earlier years. 
"The real exchange rate was calculated as the nominal exchange rate deflated by the Turkish wholesale 
price index and adjusted for the price level of Turkey's Group of 7 trading partners. 
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Table 3.4. PC Income in Turkey 







Source: State Institute of Statistics 
Table 3.5. Average Annual Growth ~ate in GNP, Consumer Price 
Index Agriculture and Manufacturing (%) (1978-91) 
Years ·GNP CPI Agriculture Manufacturing 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
1978-80 -0.5 70.2 1.9 -2.3 
1981-3 4.5 31.1 0.7 7.4 
1984-7 7.3 41.5 2.0 8.9 
1988 1.5 75.4 7.9 1.6 
1989 0.9 68.8 -7.4 2.9 
1990 9.7 60.4 8.2 9.7 
1991 0.3 71.4 -1.5 2.3 




Table 3.6. Outstanding Foreign Debt($ million), Debt/GNP, Debt Service/ 
Exports and Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves ($ million) 
(1977-1991) 
Years Foreign debt Debt/GNP Debt service/eJqJorts F orex gross reserves 
($million) (%) (%) (%) 
1977 10886 727 
1978 14681 902 
1979 14620 795 
1980 16227 28.0 22.7 1308 
1981 16861 28.6 21.4 1571 
1982 17619 32.8 26.4 1873 
1983 18385 35.6 29.5 2098 
1984 21258 41.5 27.0 3099 
1985 25349 48.1 32.9 2615 
1986 31228 55.6 33.8 3187 
1987 38304 59.3 36.4 3959 
1988 37694 58.0 40.4 5228 
1989 40282 51.5 36.7 7762 
1990 49035 45.0 31.2 10349 
1221 ~2210 13148 
Source: The Central Bank of Turkey and State Institute of Statistics 
N.B. Exports cover exports of goods and services. Reserves include reserves with the Central Bank and 
commercial banks 
Table 3.7. Sources of the Increase in External Debt (1980-90) 
Items 
Current account deficit 
Forex reserve increase * 
Change in cross-currency rates ** 
Debt restructuring *** 
Lending abroad 
Errors and omissions in the balance of payments 
Increase in external debt ($ billion) 
Source: The Central Bank of Turkey 
* Excluding gold 











*** Conversion of FMS high-interest rate credits into commercial loans with lower interest rates and 
postponement of interest payments on OECD loans 
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Table 3.8. Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rate of TL, 
Exports and Exports/Imports, Exports/GNP (1978-91) 
Exchange rate of TL Exports 
Years Nominal Real effective ($million) (%) (%) 
TLI$ (Weighted) ratio to ratio to 
GNP Imports 
1978 25.0 128.7 2288.2 4.3 50.0 
1979 35.0 145.3 2261.2 3.4 44.6 
1980 88.9 103.9 2910.2 5.0 36.8 
1981 129.6 97.8 4702.9 8.1 52.7 
1982 185.1 85.2 5746.0 10.7 65.0 
1983 274.0 80.3 5727.9 11.2 62.0 
1984 432.5 75.8 7133.7 14.8 66.3 
1985 567.9 64.3 7958.0 16.1 70.2 
1986 755.2 64.9 7456.6 12.8 67.2 
1987 999.2 64.5 10190.0 15.2 72.0 
1988 1794.8 62.2 11661.8 16.4 81.4 
1989 2304.4 68.2 11624.7 14.8 73.8 
1990 2951.1 76.5 12959.5 12.0 58.1 
1991 3795.8 75.6 13672.0 13.0 63.6 
Source: The Central Bank of Turkey and the State Institute of Statistics. 
N.B. The real effective exchange rate of TL is the weighted average with US dollars assigned a weight 
of75% and DM a weight of25%; the base date ofthe index is May 1981. 
Exports and Imports refer to merchandise trade only. 
Table 3.9. Current Account and Non-interest Current Account 
































































Source: State Institute of Statistics, State Planning Organization, The Central Bank. 
CA: Current account 
DI: direct foreign investment 
Portfolio 1: portfolio investment 
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Table 3.10. Total Domestic Saving and Investment Rates, 
Foreign Saving Rate, Private and Public Investment --









Source: State Planning Organization. 
It: total domestic investment rate yearly. 

















S,: foreign saving flow rate (minus sign shows inflow, plus sign outflow) yearly. 
I..r and Spr: private investment and saving rate yearly. 









Table 3.11. Share of Agriculture, Wages-Salaries and Others in 







1988 (*) 18.5 
1989 (*) 17.6 
1990 (*) 18.9 
1991 (*) 16.9 
Source: [Ref. 21:p. 6], Table 2 
(*): Provisional estimates. 
Wages-Salaries Others Total 
(%) (%) (%) 
34.8 35.0 100.0 
34.0 40.5 100.0 
24.8 52.9 100.0 
18.3 61.9 100.0 
17.4 64.1 100.0 
20.5 61.9 100.0 
21.7 59.4 100.0 
23.6 59.5 100.0 




Table 3.12. Money Supply and Credit, 1979-91 (end ofyear; billions ofTL) 
Money supply (M4) 
Currency and sight 
Time deposits 
Total(M2) 
Central bank deposit 
Foreign liabilities 
Foreign exchange deposits 




Commercial bank deposits 
Commercial bank lending 
Industry 
Agriculture 
Foreign trade and 




Annual growth rates 
Money supply (M3) 
Total(M2) 
Central bank deposit 













































































































































































































5,292 8,369 12,815 
7,404 13,150 18,436 














3,450 4,961 9,634 19,612 30,759 
240 397 555 1,749 3,308 



























IV. ASSESSMENT OF REFORMS AND THEIR SUSTAINABILITY 
A. CONSEQUENCES OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 
Structural adjustment policies (SAP) have been in effect for twelve years (1980 
through 1991), thus making possible a realistic evaluation of their outcomes. Turkey 
has been depicted as a highly successful example of the transition to a free-market 
economy via the SAP. 
1. Favorable Outcomes 
The first point to emphasize is that the most notable achievement of SAP is 
that lately it seems to have solved Turkey's perennial foreign-exchange problem. 
New export sectors have evolved, and some of the existing industries have become 
export-oriented; import bottlenecks no longer hamper economic growth; and debt 
servicing proceeds without disruption. 
Second, the economy has been further integrated into international markets 
through an enlarged foreign-trade sector. Additionally, many service industries have 
expanded such as tourism, transportation, and contracting. The spirit of globalization 
is well established in large companies, they began to form key relations with foreign 
companies both at home and abroad. That is, the Turkish economy has been able to 
orientate itself in the direction of the world economy at large and has been able to 
keep pace with the other semi-industrialized countries in attempts to globalize their 
activities. In this sense, the Turkish economy has become a contemporary economy. 
Third, greater international integration, plus market-determined prices at home, 
have invoked greater cost consciousness in business executives; an enhanced 
entrepreneurial spirit characterizes the younger generation who, unlike their risk-
averse predecessors, stand ready to take risks at home and abroad. People have come 
· to assume greater responsibility for their own welfare. Similar change is observed in 
the attitudes of policy makers who have become driven more by concerns of 
economic rationality than before. 
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Fourth, policy makers have exploited efforts to develop the basic market 
institutions with the pressures created by the implementation of the SAP. Such key 
prices as the interest rate and the foreign-exchange rate are now determined by market 
forces, rather than government rule, as the requisite institutions have been created. 
Finally, these favorable changes have been accompanied by non-negligible 
increases in per capita income, with the discontinuation in real devaluations and the 
20 percent appreciation in the external real effective value of the TL after 1987. 
These favorable changes in the economic domain, as well as in individual 
attitudes, have been engendered by the direct and indirect effects of the SAP during 
the period. 
2. Failure with Macro Reforms 
Despite these successes, however, the macro reforms were in difficulty. The 
major problem was that government expenditures increased beyond the ability of the 
government to increase tax collections. Government expenditures were growing more 
rapidly than GNP, despite its rapid growth. This is reflected in the rising share of 
government expenditures in GNP shown in Table 4.1. This increase in expenditures 
took place despite the repression of civil servant salaries and the virtual elimination 
of SEE deficits as a budgetary drain (at least until the 1990s). The major increases 
in expenditures were on infrastructure and interest on the debt, on a fairly sustained 
basis, and on transfer payments prior to each round of elections. This is reflected in 
Table 4.1, which gives data on government expenditures and their composition. As 
can be seen, interest payments c~nstituted only 4 percent of government expenditures 
in 1981 and had risen to more than 20 percent by the late 1980s. Investment 
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Sources: for 1979-80, State Planning Organization, The Development before the 5th Development Pkm; for 1981-82, Central Bank of Turkey Annual Report, 1985; 
for 1983, Central Bank of Turkey Annual Report, 1987; for 1984-86, Central Bank of Turkey Annual Report, 1989; for 1987-91, Central Bank of Turkey Annual 
Report, 1991. The numbers in Central Bank of Turkey annual reports are based on Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade provisional numbers. 
. "Provisional numbers. 
thereafter, while transfers fluctuated with the proximity to elections. Simultaneously, 
tax revenues were growing more slowly than income.19 
There is no mystery as to why inflation persisted. Throughout the 1980s, 
monetary expansion continued and by all estimates, was the crucial determining 
factor in the inflation rate. Financial liberalization, and in particular the moves 
toward full convertibility of the Turkish Lira, led to some currency substitution: 
whereas the ratio ofM2 to GNP fell from .224 to .203 over the 1984-1990 period, the 
ratio of M2 plus foreign exchange holdings of Turkish nationals rose froni .231 to 
.253 over that period. The Central Bank tried to use a variety of instruments to curb 
inflation, but was essentially powerless to do so in the face of the financing needs of 
the government budget.20 In 1991, the OECD provided reduced form econometric 
estimates of the inflation rate and the differences between the government deficit and 
the effect of output growth on base-money demand. According to those estimates, 
over 70 percent of the variability in underlying inflation in Turkey could be explained 
by the monetization of public sector deficits. 21 
Until the late 1980s, the association of prospective elections with successive 
periods of inflation was evident to all, and there was some credibility to the notion 
that government expenditures would be contained "after the election." By the late 
1980s, however, it was apparent to all that the support for Prime Minister Ozal and 
the Motherland Party was weakening, and that there was little prospect that 
1~e imposition of the value-added tax in 1985 was judged a great success and yielded more revenue initially 
than had been anticipated. However, in order to improve incentives, the Ozal government had reduced very high 
marginal tax rates and corporate tax rates. The net result was that tax revenues did not rise proportionately with 
income. In [Ref 22], a logarithmic regression of tax revenues oli GNP for the period from 1980 to 1991 has been 
analyzed. In this study, it is estimated that the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to real GNP growth for the 
entire period is 0.84. 
2<fu order to investigate whether inflation caused money creation or conversely, see [Ref. 22] for more statistical 
and analytical information. 
21See also [Ref. 23], which provides a rationale for such an estimation procedure. 
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government budgetary discipline could be relied upon to bring about a significant 
reduction in the rate of inflations. 
When new elections in 1991 returned Suleyman Demirel to the Prime 
Minister's office leading a coalition government, the earlier problems intensified. 
The fiscal deficit increased sharply as, among other things, the SEE drain on the 
government budget increased sharply. 
3. Some Additional Dilemmas 
Exchange-Rate Policy: on the exchange rate, the government's policy has been 
to achieve a trend toward real depreciation. An occasional real appreciation aside, 
the real exchange rate has indeed depreciated steadily during the period. The policy 
had an important effect on top of its direct effect of rendering exporting and import-
substituting more profitable. 
It is difficult to see why the need for a policy of real depreciation should 
persist almost an entire decade. There are many costs imposed by continuous real j 
depreciations. First, in an economy like Turkey's, they tend to depress real wages. 
Second, they tend to keep real interest rates higher domestically than abroad. Finally, 
they tend to increase the real burden of the public sector's external debt. 
Judging by the behavior of market participants, and by the absence of 
substantial premium in the black market, the path of the nominal exchange rate 
appears sustainable in the short run. Controlling inflation via the exchange rate is a 
risky business over the medium to the longer run. In the absence of sufficient fiscal 
cut, consistent with lower inflation brings two outcomes; continued real appreciation, 
with damaging consequences for the export drive and real activity; and a sudden 
collapse of the exchange rate, creating an upward pressure on inflation. [Ref. 23 :p. 
346] 
Investment in Manufactures: one of the surprising features of the export boom, 
which is largely based on manufactures, is the absence of an underlying investment 
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drive. Public investment in manufacturing steadily declined after 1980. This was 
consistent with the redirection of public capital formation towards areas that do not 
compete with the private sector, such as infrastructure. The expectation was that 
private manufacturing investment would eliminate this fall once the economy started 
growing. But this expectation has been failed. In 1988, total manufacturing 
investment still stood at only two-thirds of its level in the peak year of 1977. 
The reasons for this disappointing performance are not entirely clear. An 
important part of the explanation can be addressed to the atmosphere of 
macroeconomic instability. Both inflation and the real interest rate have been quite 
variable. Additionally, manufacturing investment is quite sensitive to uncertainty in 
these variables. This discourages investment not only through its effect on the cost 
of capital, but also through its negative impact on the balance sheets of big firms. 
Trade policy has aggravated the environment of uncertainty by giving inconsistent 
signals, such as import duties and export subsidies that have been frequently 
manipulated. Investors focused on the comparatively safe sector of housing [Ref. 
23:p. 347]. 
Income Distribution: Table 4.2 shows the information of the redistribution that 
has taken place since the late 1970s. In 1988, the real wage and the agricultural terms 
of trade stood at barely over half their 1973levels; meanwhile, aggregate per capita 
income had increased more than a third. This has gone alongside a rather striking 
realignment of factor shares in national income. Agriculture's share has fallen from 
24 percent (1980) to 16 percent (1988). The share of wages and salaries has gone 
down from 27 percent to 14 percent. Fiscal cuts become more difficult when major 
popular sectors already feel that they have paid more than their due. Public sector 
wage settlements have also come under similar pressures during the period [Ref. 23 :p. 
349]. 
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Table 4.2. Distributional Indicators (1973 = 1 00) 
Real per Agricultural Real 
capita GNP terms of trade wages 
1973 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1974 104.7 90.5 97.7 
1975 110.1 105.5 105.4 
1976 116.4 112.8 121.7 
1977 118.5 117.0 124.2 
1978 119.4 96.3 122.6 
1979 116.5 78.4 101.5 
1980 112.9 69.8 72.2 
1981 114.4 69.3 64.8 
1982 116.2 63.2 64.6 
1983 116.9 61.2 67.3 
1984 120.2 63.7 61.0 
1985 124.9 58.9 54.8 
1986 131.3 56.5 54.4 
1987 131.8 60.8 55.1 
1988 139.2 54.1 54.6 
Source: [Ref. 23]. 
4. Reasons for Successful Sectoral and Failed Macro Reforms 
There is little mystety remaining as to why there was inflation in Turkey. The 
interesting questions center on how the sectoral reforms could have succeeded, at 
least initially, while the macro reforms were unable to stabilize the economy, and how 
macroeconomic instability has affected, and will affect, the sustainability of the 
sectoral reforms. 
Three major factors probably account for the success and durability of the 
sectoral reforms during the 1980s: 
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1. there was the evident failure of earlier economic policies; 
2. there was the personality, determination, and control of Prime Minister 
Ozal; the personality and commitment of Ozal can not be doubted. Not 
only did he believe in changing the role of government in the economy, 
he believed it was the achievement for which history would remember 
him. In that sense, it was at the top of his agenda and received his 
personal attention; 
3. there was the initial success of the sectoral reforms in bringing about 
evident changes. 
If those factors account for the sustainability of the sectoral reforms, at least 
through the late 1980s, why were the macro reforms less successful? The primary 
reason was that the government was unable to increase revenues or reduce 
expenditures in ways that would permit the Central Bank to break the growth of the 
money supply more than it in fact did. The question, then, is why the government's 
fiscal pasture remained so expansionary. 
That answer, too, has several parts: 
1. there is the personality of Prime Minister Ozal. There seems to be little 
doubt that, committed as Ozal was to shifting toward more reliance on 
the private sector for economic growth, he was also an engineer and, 
perhaps due to this, a builder. He attached less weight to the goal of 
combating inflation than he did to the goal of resuming and accelerating 
growth with more efficient allocation of resources and reliance on the 
private sector; 
2. there was some genuine infrastructural problems that needed to be 
addressed if the private sector was to be able to expand in accordance 
with Ozal' s blueprint; 
3. most important, however, were the political constraints imposed on the 
Motherland Party (MP) in its attempt to maintain power. The fact is 
that Ozal's support was weakening, and in an effort to retain power, he 
apparently perceived little option but to increase expenditures in the 
hope of gaining support. In the end he was unsuccessful, but the new 
coalition government that followed found the imperative to increase 
government expenditures even more compelling, and inflationary 
pressures intensified. 
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B. SUSTAINABILITY OF THE REFORMS 
From the debt crisis, which has plagued much of the Third World since the 
early 1980s, Turkey has emerged as the "paragon of export-led growth" and an 
inspiring example of stabilization and liberalization. In sharp contrast to Latin 
American countries, its rapid gradual recovery of health made it possible to restore 
it creditworthiness in international markets and regain relatively high growth rates. 
This can be expressed as "life after debt'' [Ref. 24:p. 161]. After more than a decade 
of economic stabilization and structural adjustment, however, it is possible to argue 
that the results of these programs left much to be desired. Thus, it is not intended to 
suggest that the problem has only one dimension. Any attempt at reform has to be 
considered within the context of the underlying economic and financial policies and 
the developments from which the crisis has emerged. 
When the country's domestic considerations are coupled with volatile 
international interest and exchange rates, the problem of stabilization, and especially 
of an external debt overhang, becomes rather unmanageable. It was such a 
combination that led developing countries in the 1980s to find themselves faced with 
capital outflows when they needed fresh inflows. Therefore, a significant reduction 
in the volatility of international interest rates and exchange rates should be considered 
crucial in achieving a workable set of measures to deal with the problem of 
sustainable stability and adjustment. 
Without the restoration of more favorable terms of trade for the developing 
countries, a sustained improvement in the access of the developing world's exports 
to the markets of industrialized countries, and an increasing level of private direct 
investment, all efforts of the developing countries to design and implement a coherent 
stabilization program are bound to be short-lived, as well as politically and 
economically unbearable. 
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The 1980s undoubtedly had witnessed unprecedented and, even more 
importantly, irreversible changes in the Turkish economy. Nearly 70 years after the 
foundation of the republic, Turkey can gradually, at last, look forward to both healthy 
and sustainable free-market oriented growth and a gradual integration of the Turkish 
economy into the European Community (EC) and the world economy. 
Starting from this background and these expectations, the October 1991 
elections led a peaceful transition of government, confirming the growing maturity 
of Turkey's paliamentary democracy. This was followed by the relatively smooth 
formation of a coalition between Demirel's center-right and head of Socialist Populist 
Party Erdal Inonfi's center-left parties. This coalition was followed by another 
coalition with the same parties under the Prime Ministry of Tansu Ciller, and now a 
new coalition after the election of December 1995 under the Prime Ministry of Mesut 
Yilmaz (Head of Motherland Party). All these coalitions faced increasing business 
skepticism about their economic record. Growth may be higher than in most 
countries, but inflation, still has remained a thorn in the economy's side and all 
coalitions' economic programs can be criticized both for its content and the slowness 
of its formulation. The irony is that this slow progress in carrying out election 
promises in line with the previous reform program is due more to a lack of 
commitment to those promises than to the delays inherent in governing through a 
wide-based coalition. 
In fact, as we look through each coalition, the structure of the coalition 
inspired in many circles exactly the opposite expectation with respect to the speed and 
efficiency of government performance on major social, political and economic issues. 
Therefore, it appears that, having missed the honeymoon period for action, the current 
government must come up with a plan to restore the lost momentum. The most vital 
point in the search for a new set of complementary policies is to fill the gaps in the 
previous program and fine tune it. The new government also has to review the policy . 
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instruments and institutions in place, since some of those employed in the 1970s and 
1980s are no longer valid in the context of the 1990s. 
The most noticeable characteristic of the 1980 economic program was its 
accurate diagnosis that one of Turkey's scarcest resources was neither foreign 
exchange, nor savings, nor labor, but rather an efficient mechanism for making 
macroeconomic decisions. The efficiency, speed, and flexibility imparted to the 
previously inert policymaking mechanism by such institutions as the Money and 
Credit Board and the Economic Coordination Committee go a long way toward· 
accounting for the program's success up to 1985-86. Clearly it is first priority today 
to get this decision making mechanism functioning properly again, as it has been 
deteriorating since 1987. This deterioration accelerated in 1989 when Turgut Ozal 
assumed the presidency. Similarly, the extrabudgetary funds introduced as an 
institutional reform have lost their original target of allocative efficiency in public 
funds and have become the major source of the financial disarray. The foreign trade 
regime has been increasingly liberalized over the past decade. As there is no question 
of reverting to the quota system or export incentives in the form of tax refunds, the 
time has come to liberalize the system still further, avoiding unfair competition 
through the objective and effective implementation of antidumping and antitrust 
regulations, while simultaneously expanding export-import bank lending and export 
insurance services. Recent arrangements with the European Free Trade Association 
and commitment to integration with the Euorpean Community (EC) in the form of a 
customs union in 1996 are the right steps taken in this area. 
To capitalize on these developments, Turkey has to develop its own export 
markets, using new opportunities and intensifying its efforts such as the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation and closer ties with the new republics in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. Easily accessible markets like those in the Middle East in 
the early 1980s no longer exist. It is also crucial not to overemphasize the role of the 
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monetary authority and monetary policy in Turkey's export-led market orientation. 
In fact, since 1980, monetary policy has had to be concerned with both domestic 
stability and the balance of payments. This means that more support from the fiscal 
side is urgently needed. Otherwise the Central Bank's credibility will be at risk for 
an unintended cause. New and consistent macroeconomic policies, as well as better 
coordination in their implementation is required to restore and sustain credibility, and 
thus to achieve steady growth under conditions of price stablility. 
Foreign exchange regulations and policies have been deregulated to the point 
of no return, and integration with international markets is on the way. Consequently, 
the response to developments on foreign markets should not be to resort to artificial 
amendments and interventions such as exchange controls, but rather to adjust 
domestic economic policies, fiscal and monetary, to eliminate differences in inflation 
rates between Turkey and its trading partners. A realistic exchange rate policy is a 
tool for balance of payments adjustment, not for inflation control. It is also 
particularly important that the Turkish financial markets, which have been integrating 
with international financial markets since 1980, continue to do so and keep up the 
process of self-renewal. 
As the market economy has taken root, the public authorities can achieve 
economic development and combat inflation, this is the inevitable outcome of 
building a free-market economy. Against this limitation on the options available to 
policymakers, there is an important positive side of having market forces and 
institutions functioning. Today we can comfortably talk about a considerable 
improvement of the Turkish economy's ability to respond to external and internal 
shocks without any public authority's intervention by law and decree. However, this 
phenomenon itself makes the whole system more vulnerable to any change. 
It is important to note that initiating a reform program depends on certain 
preconditions, but sustaining that program requires some additional ones. Although 
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the January 1980 program looked comprehensive, in its implementation stage, one 
key point was ignored or postponed; public-sector fmances. That is why inflation 
remains an unresolved issue. The cost of not addressing this problem directly and in 
time is that the credibility of the whole program today being questioned. 
If we assume that the reforms are completed, then the next concern is to avoid 
another problem by creating some beneficiaries of the program withing the new 
system: such as exporters, construction companies, savers, importers, professional 
market representatives, trade unions, academics, and media professionals,' who will 
lobby for sustaining the reforms. Unfortunately, today what we are observing in 
Turkey is just the opposite. The current government is facing a real challenge to 
reverse this situation and initiate a complementary reform package that includes 
reform of public finances. The vulnerability of the liberalized and deregulated 
economy should always be a prime concern to public decision makers. 
A key deficiency in Turkey's implementation of market oriented reforms was 
the failure to establish an efficient, speedy and just legal system, whether in the 
administrative, taxation, or juridical domain. In fact, the most important element of 
a successful free-market economy is an atmosphere in which there is little or no room 
for unfair competition. If some market players can easily get away with the reduced 
rules and regulations without being penalized either by the market or by the law, the 
new market system easily becomes self-defeating. When that happens, most people 
blame the market system rather than determinants of that system; the tax and audit 




V. MANAGING ECONOMIC REFORMS AND 
LONG-RUN GROWm 
A. IMPORTANT FACTORS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
We can define economic development as the process whereby the real per 
capita income of a country increases over a long period of time subject to the 
stipulations that the number of people below an "absolute poverty line" does not 
increase, and that the distribution of income does not become more unequal. We 
should emphasize process because it implies the operation of certain forces in an 
interconnected and casual fashion. 
Economic development involves something more than economic growth. 
Development should be explained as "growth plus change": there are some essential 
qualitative dimensions in the development process that extend beyond the growth of 
expansion of an economy through a simple widening process. This qualitative 
difference can be in the improved performance of the factors of production, in the 
improved techniques of production, in the development of institutions and a change 
in attitudes and values. 
If our focus on the development of a country arises from our desire to remove 
mass poverty, then we should emphasize as the primary goal a rise in per capita real 
income rather than simply an increase in the economy's real national income, 
uncorrected for population change. But, if the criterion were only and increase in real 
national income, then it would be an improvement in living standards by aggregating 
output efficiently. 
Another important issue is the "long period" of time which is related to a 
sustained increase in real income. From this standpoint, a five-year development plan 
is only the start of the development process and it can be seen as the initiating power 
to sustain the process. But, it should be understood that there is a vital distinction 
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between initiating development and the more difficult task of sustaining development 
over the long run. 
Although the increase in real income per capita can be adopted as the primary 
goal, economic development should be interpreted in terms of a number of subgoals 
and strategic objectives. Thus, the alleviation of poverty and diminution of economic 
inequality are some of the objectives of development plans. A few of the many 
possible other subgoals may be the specification of a minimum level of consumption, 
a certain composition to the consumption stream, and a maximum ·level of 
unemployment that will be tolerated; the avoidance of marked disparities in the 
prosperity and growth of different regions within a country; and the diversification 
of the economy [Ref. 25:p. 8]. 
With these variety of policy objectives, the emphasis on various dimensions 
of economic development can vmy at different times and in different countries. That 
is why it is important to interpret economic development as economic progress or 
increase in economic welfare. 
The process of development has a profound impact on social institutions, 
habits and beliefs, and it is likely to introduce a number of. sources of tension and 
discord. Tensions arise when the inequalities of income distribution, both among 
individuals and among regions, tend to increase; when development creates open 
unemployment and when the pressures of rapid urbanization occur. Discords arise 
from the contrasts between modem and backward communities -- especially modem 
functions on traditional institutions. 
In this context, a policy maker must adopt his/her approach on first an increase 
in per capita real income as the best available overall index of economic development, 
and then the following subgoals and the strategic objectives. The quality of 
development is completely masked if the policy maker does not pierce the aggregate 
measure of gross national product (GNP) and consider its composition and 
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distribution. He/she must recognize several dimensions of economic development. 
Instead of seeking development as an end, a policy maker might better view it as an 
instrumental process for overcoming persistent poverty and achieving human 
development [Ref. 25 :p. 9]. 
B. THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
For a long time, economists relied on a traditional theory that offered little 
scope for policy to influence important sources of growth. According to these 
traditional growth theories, the main determinants of long-run economic growth are 
not influenced by economic incentives. Recently, however, the study of economic 
growth has been reinvigorated by new developments in theory and empirical findings 
that suggest growth is in the sphere of policy [Ref. 26:p. 25]. This new theory, 
referred to as endogenous growth theory, helps to explain easily movements in long-
term economic growth. 
Endogenous growth theories are based on the idea that long-run growth is 
determined by economic incentives. The most popular models of this type maintain 
that inventions are intentional and generate technological spillovers that lower the 
cost of future innovations. Naturally, in this model, an educated workforce plays a 
special role in determining the rate of technological innovation and long-run growth 
[Ref. 26:p. 28]. The implication is that productivity growth might be related to the 
structure and policies followed by the economy rather than to nature and luck. 
Human capital as an input to production is an important determinant to long-
run economic growth. In addition to human capital, a country's economic 
environment can play an important role in influencing economic growth. For 
example, internal competitive structure, a country's openness to trade, its political 
stability, and the efficiency of its government can influence innovative activity and 
economic growth. 
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Human knowledge: an educated populace is a key to economic growth. A 
larger educated workforce may increase growth either because of faster technological 
progress, as individuals build on the ideas of others, or by simply adding to the 
productive capacity of a countty. One of the important ways for developing countries 
to advance is through investment in education. [Ref. 26:p. 33] 
Political and governmental factors: an extremely unstable government can 
create insecurity about the future and decrease the incentives to invest in future 
development. Likewise, people will not invest in developing new products in they 
can not get the rewards of their ideas. Although, it is difficult to measure property 
rights in a country, they suffer when the countty experiences a large number of 
revolutions and political assassinations. 
If political instability has a negative influence on growth, how does the size of 
government affect economic growth? The answer is the larger the share of 
government spending (excluding defense and education) in total Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), the lower the growth and investment. The government investment 
has no statistically significant effect on economic growth. A government may attempt 
to increase private productivity through government spending, but the . evidence 
suggests it has not such effect and may even decease growth. Growth appears to fall 
with higher government spending because of lower private savings and because of the 
distorti.omuy effects from taxation and government expenditure programs. [Ref. 26:p. 
34] 
. International trade: countries that are open to international trade grow faster 
than closed economies. A countty open to international trade may experience faster 
technological progress and increased economic growth because the cost of developing 
new technology falls as more high-tech goods are available. In other words, trade 
increases growth because it makes a greater variety of products and technologies 
available. 
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Eguipment investment: equipment investment has potentially large effects on 
economic growth. New technologies have tended to be embodied in new types of 
machines. Investments in machinery and equipment are a strategic factor in growth 
and possibly carry large positive benefits in generating further technological progress. 
Overview of determinants behind growth: Table 5.1 summarizes determinants 
that have been shown to influence growth rates. As the table indicates, deterrilinants 
that are associated with increasing human or physical capital investment tend to 
enhance technological progress and economic growth. On the other hand, 
determinants that reduce incentives to invest, or interfere with well-functioning 
markets, tend to reduce growth. [Ref. 26:p. 35] 
Table 5.1. Determinants of Economic Growth 
Growth Enhancing 
Schooling, education investment 
Capital savings, investment 
Equipment investment 
Level of human capital 
Source: [Ref. 26:p. 36) 
Growth Reducing 
Government consumption spending 
Political, social instability 
Trade barriers 
Socialism 
C. MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND LONG-RUN GROWTH 
It is important to address the role of macroeconomic polices in determining 
long-run rates of productivity growth. This approach can bring some crucial aspects 
in productivity growth which suggest that much of what is important for raising 
growth rates lie in the domain of structural policy, since macroeconomic polices are 
less than dominant in determining rates of productivity growth. In this context, we 
should focus on two fundamental macroeconomic decisions any society makes: 
how aggregate demand (or its near-equivalent nominal income) will be 
managed, and 
how total output will be allocated between consumption and various 
forms of investment. 
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...._ _______________________________________ _ 
The policy conclusions can be stated as follows: 
Much of the variation in productivity growth rates can not be traced to 
macroeconomic policies and must be attributed to structural and 
external factors. Bad macroeconomic policies can ensure dismal 
performance, but good macroeconomic policies, while necessary, are 
not sufficient for outstanding productivity performance [Ref. 27:p. 5]. 
Monetary policy that either encourages high inflation or permits large-
scale financial collapse can inflict severe damage on productivity 
growth. Countries in which workers, investors, and entrepreneurs have 
confidence in the political independence of an inflation-fighting central 
bank can attain significantly more price stability [Ref. 27:p. 6]. 
In developing countries, most of the emphasis is on stabilization rather 
than growth policies. This emphasis reflects broader social priorities. 
The media everywhere track unemployment fluctuations much more 
than productivity fluctuations. Job creation is more prominent in 
political debates than productivity enhancement. 
Most of the time, governments feel an obligation to use the tools of 
monetary and fiscal policy to mitigate recessions and avoid depressions 
without allowing inflation to reach unacceptable levels. However, we 
can say that the macroeconomic objectives of output stabilization and 
inflation control are essentially independent of the objective of rapid 
long-run growth. Long-run growth depends on supply factors such as 
the accumulation of physical and human capital and technological 
progress. Inflationary policies can impact levels of output in the short-
run, but they can not raise and run the risk of reducing long-run levels 
of output [Ref. 27:p. 12]. 
One of the most fundamental decisions that any society makes is the 
decision as to how resources are to be allocated between the present 
and the future, or equivalently between consumption and investment. 
In terms of policy implications, raising the quality of investment is very 
important relative to raising the quantity of investment. Finding the 
highest return investments, and managing public investments as 
efficiently as possible, is crucial. Identifying and promoting such 
strategic investments is a critical way in which public policy can 
promote growth. Much of this involves policy with a structural or 
microeconomic decision. 
As we discussed earlier, equipment investment has a special role as a 
trigger of productivity growth. This suggests that neutrality across 
80 
assets is an inappropriate goal for tax policies, and that equipment 
investment should receive special incentives [Ref. 27:p. 6]. 
D. CONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC REFORM 
Economists can not luxuriate in political agnosticism, telling themselves that 
they have done their duty once they have offered a menu of policies to politicians. 
Rather, they must be concerned with the conditions under which their advice is 
followed and this implies a need to concern themselves with the questions of political 
economy. In this context, I will tty to depict some important conditions that need to 
be taken into account by economists as well as politicians. 
Solid political base: Bringing reforms to fulfil desired results requires 
acceptable support over time. One would expect that to be difficult unless a 
government enjoys a solid base of legislative support. A government might be able 
to compensate for the lack of a strong base of support if the opposition is fragmented 
and unable to challenge it on reforms that are initially likely to be unpopular. 
Social consensus: Reformers should feel constrained by the need to establish 
a social consensus, or spend their time trying to build one. If reformers succeed, a 
social consensus will form in support of their measure. This is crucial for 
sustainablity of reform programs. In a democracy, what the public is willing to accept 
in the way of good economic policy will, at some point, constrain what can be 
introduced. Economists who want to see good economic policies implemented have 
a duty to tty and educate the public as well as policy makers. 
Visionarv leadership: Economists should emphasize the importance of 
leadership. One of the key conditions for successful economic reform is a visionary 
leader with a sense of history: an individual with a long-term view. 
Coherent economic team: Economic reform requires a coherent and united 
economic team. Reforms will not happen unless an economic team is coherently 
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organized. In an economy, a good and united team can be a precondition for reform 
to have a chance. 
The presence of a technopol: It is important for successful reform to have 
economists in positions of political responsibility, rather than serving as technical 
advisors. 
The role of media: It can be a mistake to expect too much from an ability to 
build support for reform through the use of the media. Media might help at some 
point to make contact with the public in declaration of gains to winners in order to 
establish a social consensus. 
Most policy oriented economists believe that they have useful advice to give 
policy makers, and when their advice is disregarded, they tend to say what are 
intended to be unkind things about failures of leadership and a lack of political will. 
This fits uncomfortably with the standard professional view that the economist is an 
expert who informs the policy maker about the range of options, from which the latter 
selects the one that will maximize the social welfare function that he or she intuits to 
be the true expression of society's preferences [Ref. 28:p. 590]. 
E. STRATEGIC TBINKING FOR POLICY MAKING 
For the future, Turkey must concentrate on remedial action to overcome the 
disappointments of the past. Turkey had a number of problems because of 
inappropriate policies, and their excessive restraint relates to national economic 
management. The question now is to improve the quality of policy making and to 
make it much more effective. In order to reach a desired level, policy makers should 
create better policies. These policies depend on better ideas. 
There are some fundamental areas that can be a more intelligent basis for 
development policy making. One is that of the "unexplained residual factor'' [Ref. 
29:pp. 91-94]. Many policies bear on supply of inputs, but it is a more difficult 
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challenge to devise and implement policies to promote the income-raising forces 
constituting residual. 
Another area is the impact of "population growth" on development 
performance. The consequences of reducing population growth are likely to vary 
according to policies by which the reduction is achieved [Ref. 30:pp. 276-286]. 
The last area is the "noneconomic factors" in the development process. Today 
it is obvious to say that economic, social, and political changes are interrelated. 
Nonetheless, we can not predict under which conditions and by what mechanisms it 
is possible to have the types of sociocultural and political change that will be most 
favorable for development. It differs from country to country. The policy makers' 
responsibility in Turkey is to identify the functional relationships between economic 
and noneconomic factors and their quantitative significance. They should find a 
better way to operate on economic incentives, attitudes, organizational structure, 
social relations, and any of the many other factors that connect economic and 
noneconomic change. 
Knowledge of political conditions is especially important to achieve 
improvements in policy making. Reform in economic policy making also depends on 
political reform. The focus should be the elimination of corruption and more 
effective administration. Even if economists do have ideas for appropriate policies --
even if they do agree on what has gone wrong and how to put it right -- will 
government policy makers listen to them? Economists recommend stabilization 
programs, but inflation remains recurrent and governments practice stop-go measures. 
The policy makers' objective may not be efficiency, but that of rising 
employment, lower prices out of consideration for welfare, and a more equitable 
distribution of income and wealth. Policy makers may also have to adopt alternative 
or complementary policies because they can not solve other problems when there are 
multiple objectives. 
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The policy maker lives within a constraint policy triangle. At one vertex is 
accelerated development; at the secon~ external balance; and at the third, freer trade. 
The three objectives can not be achieved simultaneously. In favor of accelerated 
development, the policy maker should adopt complementary policies with respect to 
trade and balance of payments. 
In this context, we should attempt to explain why government failures occur. 
A careful analysis can be the first step in answering this question. As depicted in 
Figure 5.1, economists offer predictions and prescriptions to the policy maker, who 
in tum exercises a policy choice that is implemented with a resultant policy outcome. 
In offering prescriptions, the economist is guided by some notion of the public 
interest, generally based on welfare economics. There are other forces, categorized 
as society-centered or state-centered, which impinge on the policy maker and 
determine policy choice. The society-centered forces provide societal inputs to a 
passive government and the policy choice becomes a dependent variable. The 
demand from society creates the supply of policy. On the other han~ state-centered 
forces have their own objectives. They are autonomous and active for policy choice 
[Ref. 31 :pp. 580-581]. The problem begins with harmonizing these inputs as a whole 
to come up with the best policy choice. The policy makers' responsibility is to 
balance these factors for the sake of the continuity of the policy making process. 
Implementation 
Figure 5.1. The Policy Formation Process 




To achieve an improvement in the quality of policy making does not mean to 
focus only on centralized planning or the laissez-faire of a minimalist state. For each 
of these types of economic management, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. 
What is needed instead is the avoidance of both market failure and government 
failure. While correcting market failure, economic management must restrict 
government to doing only what the government can do better than the private sector. 
[Ref. 31 :p. 581-582] 
Political stability is one of the crucial issues for development. The ·empirical 
evidence confirms that political instability hinders development. Most important for 
stability and continuity of policy reform is an understanding of what causes the 
successes· of government policy. 
If economists are to become more influential in advising how to correct 
nonmarket failures and overcome resistance to policy reform, they will have to give 
more attention to policy situations. It is especially necessary to make policy changes 
transparent by identifying the distribution of not only the economic, but also the 
political, costs and benefits of policy changes, and by identifying the gainers and 
losers. To promote policy reform, it is then necessary to ex:amine possible ways to 
compensate the loser, discover the possibilities for building supportive coalitions, and 
consider the scope for alternative institutional arrangements. It is especially important 
to insulate policy makers from rent-seekers and interest groups so that government 
can give more attention to the efficiency of the economy and less to distribution for 




The purpose of this research has been to bring together in one docwnent as 
much of the unclassified information as possible concerning a careful analysis of the 
Turkish experience in economic stabilization during the 1980s. It has identified the 
factors that have affected Turkey's economy during this period and provided 
statistical and analytical data to assess the sustainability of the Turkish program. 
Interpretation of these data and generalizations drawn as to the efficiency of economic 
policy making led to the following conclusion. 
The Turkish economy is facing the risk of relative stagnation as we approach 
the next century. Without any significant improvement in the efficiency of 
investments, the role of capital formation is significantly lower than that of sixteen 
years ago, leading to a lower rate of potential growth. Both investment and saving 
rates are lower than the requirements of a dynamic growth. 
Turkey's experience during the 1980s in implementing market-oriented 
reforms as part of a growth-oriented adjustment ·strategy suggests that a set of 
comprehensive and coherent reform policies backed by political determination and 
public support can make economic recovery leading to a sustainable growth possible. 
Every country embarking on structural transformation will necessarily have 
different sets of policies and instrwnents to choose from. But whatever policies and 
instruments a country selects, the commitment and the determination of the political 
authority to carry the program through, and the confidence of the public in its 
economic leadership are essential ingredients for success. No country undertaking 
a major structural transformation through market orientation should adopt a static or 
fixed strategy. Given the dynamic nature of developing country economies on the one 
hand, and the unstable but mostly progressive nature of international markets on the 
other, the initial set of reform policies will be and should be subject to continuous 
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review. In fact, one of the most significant results of any market-oriented structural 
program is to increase and improve the economy's ability to respond to internal and 
external developments through market forces. Economic growth is an imperative, not 
a choice. Without growth, a country can not achieve anything else. But what is 
important today is a model of growth that links that growth with the lives of people. 
The problem now is how to survive, not how to grow sufficiently rapidly, for the new 
concept of sustainable development is based on structural economic, human, and 
environmental constraints. 
r 
Today, no one challenges the achievements of market orientation in Turkey. 
With the momentum acquired during the 1980s, people are looking for new 
dimensions, challenges, new visions and new directions. Particularly the end of the 
Cold War created the question of Turkey's reemerging identity with force. At this 
juncture, on the way to integration with the international economic system, Turkey's 
challenge is to pursue, uninterruptedly, its adjustment and transformation into a 
market economy, and its democratization, to secure sustainable but rapid growth and 
provide the living standards that Turkish people have come to expect. Dynamism 
should be kept going. This dynamism looks solid and deep rooted, but it can be lost 
if it is mismanaged. 
The Turkish people know the importance of transformation. They don't want 
to be marginalized within the context of EC. The Turkish people must consolidate 
the evolving world economy and reforms, and have to accelerate the public sector 
activities, including privatization in order to take full advantage of global 
opportunities. Everyone knows these opportunities should not be missed for future 
benefits and expectations. 
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